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In 1982 the International Livestock Centre for Africa (ILCA) established a Livestock Policy Unit 
(LPU). Later it was given additional functions and changed its title to Livestock Economics 
Division (LED).  
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1. To heighten the awareness in African governments and in other organisations of the 
importance of livestock policy issues. 
2. To collate in an easily assimilable form what is already known about policy issues and to 
present it to policy makers. 
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priority livestock policy issues and to present the results to policy makers. 
4. To encourage others to carry out similar research and to assist in presenting their results 
to policy makers. 
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research on a topic. Publication of the final results of research may not occur until several years 
after the research started. The LED, therefore, makes its working documents available to anyone 
requesting them in order to provide access to data and ideas on African livestock policy issues as 
early as possible to those with a need for them.  
This is an LED working document. It has not been prepared in accordance with procedures 
appropriate to formal printed texts, and ILCA accepts no responsibility for errors. Both data and 
ideas are subject to revision. The views and interpretations in this document are those of the 
author and should not be attributed to ILCA. ILCA however retains copyright and reserves all 
other rights. Working paper numbers 1–10 appear under the ILCA/LPU working paper series, 
which has now been renamed as the LED working documents series.  
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and careful manual recorrection. Even if the quality of digitalisation is high, the FAO declines 
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1.    Introduction 
Among the ways in which governments intervene in the livestock sub-sector the most prevalent, 
and arguably the most important, is interference with prices. Price intervention policies are often 
implemented with the aim of achieving certain broad objectives which, in developing countries, 
include output expansion, government revenue generation, improvement of income distribution, 
stabilisation and inflation control. In pursuing these objectives, governments possess a wide 
variety of policy instruments which can be manipulated directly to achieve the desired 
objectives. For example, they can establish price controls or price supports to benefit consumers 
and producers respectively, or they can impose import duties and export taxes to raise 
government revenue. In addition to direct measures, indirect forms of government intervention 
including exchange rate adjustments can also influence the production, consumption and trade of 
livestock products.  
In real practice, sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries have pursued a wide variety of pricing 
policies, differing in the choice of instruments as well as in their objectives.1 The effects of these 
policies on production incentives have also been varied. The multiplicity of objectives and 
instruments suggests that in some cases conflicts will arise between objectives and policies 
pursued to achieve them. The likelihood of such conflicts is heightened when, as it often 
happens, different ministries are interested in different objectives. The ministry of agriculture, 
for instance, may advocate higher farm prices to encourage output expansion, while the finance 
ministry may be interested in interventions which raise revenues. In this situation, one of the 
contributions of price policy research will be to quantify the effects of different policy options in 
order to permit an informed discussion which can lead to better decision making and an 
improved incentive system. 
1.  For this study, sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries are taken to include only those 39 countries listed in ILCA's 
strategy and long-term plan document (see ILCA, 1987a p. 88). 
The broad objective of this study is to review, analyze and present evidence concerning the 
effects of livestock pricing policies on production incentives in a sample of SSA countries. The 
specific objectives are:  
1. to provide a comparative picture of objectives and policy instruments used by selected 
SSA countries with respect to the livestock sub-sector and, 
2. to estimate the effects of direct and indirect price interventions on incentives, livestock 
output, consumption, trade and government revenue. 
In what follows, the experiences of six SSA countries are profiled. These countries which 
include Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, Sudan and Zimbabwe were selected on the basis 
of their livestock population, production, trade and consumption. Data were collected through 
interviews with policy makers and livestock marketing officials, and from a wide range of 
primary and secondary published documents.  
To introduce the subsequent discussion, chapter 2 examines the growth and performance of the 
livestock sub-sector in the study countries. It demonstrates the diversity of situations and 
experiences with respect to production, consumption, export and import of livestock products.  
Chapter 3 considers the multiple objectives of price policies in the selected countries and 
analyses the principal instruments employed to influence producer and consumer prices. The 
discussion highlights similarities and diversities in objectives and policies toward the livestock 
sub-sector and also examines the compatibility of goals with instruments.  
The final chapter assesses the impact of government intervention on price incentives and 
concludes by highlighting the main findings of the study.  
  
2.    Livestock production, consumption and trade in the 
study countries 
This chapter sets out to examine the main features of the livestock sub-sector in the selected 
countries by assessing trends in production, trade and consumption of a few livestock products. 
The discussion is confined to cattle, sheep and goats (the three ruminant species presently 
included in ILCA's research agenda) and to the food products (i.e. meat and milk) derived from 
them. The policy implications of the observed trends are briefly discussed to set the context for 
the discussion of pricing policy that follows.  
The production structure  
Although there are many similarities in the livestock production systems of SSA, there are also 
important variations. Such variations reflect differences in climate, availability of grazing land 
and incidence of diseases such as trypanosomiasis. For the countries selected for this study, 
pastoral systems account for the bulk of ruminant livestock production, except in Zimbabwe 
where cattle ranching and mixed crop-livestock systems are very important. Aggregate meat 
production and related data for the selected countries are shown in Table 1. The selected 
countries together account for almost half the total meat production (by weight) in SSA.2 Per 
capita meat production varies somewhat, from about 8.5 kilograms per person in Nigeria to 25.3 
kilograms per person in Sudan, reflecting substantial differences in population and pastoral 
resources among the countries considered.  
2. The corresponding figure for milk is also about 50% (see Table 2). 
Table 1. Meat production, human population and per capita gross national product in selected 
















Côte d'Ivoire 127 10.1 12.6 660 
Ethiopia 556 42.3 13.1 110 
Mali 134 7.5 17.9 150 
Nigeria 846 99.7 8.5 800 
Sudan 553 21.9 25.3 300 
Zimbabwe 110 8.4 13.1 680 
Total, selected countries 2326 189.9 12.3    
SSA 4875 418.0 11.7 400 
1.  Relates to meat from different livestock species slaughtered within national boundaries, regardless of their origin 
(FAO 1986a). 
Sources: FAO (1986a) for total meat production data; World Bank (1987) for human population 
and GNP figures.  





and lamb  
Goat 
meat  Cow's milk2  
('000 tons)  
Côte d'Ivoire  42  6  6  15  
Ethiopia  215  86  65  600  
Mali  49  20  21  106  
Nigeria  239  44  134  348  
Sudan  309  92  39  1735  
Zimbabwe  72  1  5  196  
Total, selected countries  926  249  270  3000  
SSA  2037  379  484  6125  
1.  Annual 1983–85 average.   
2.  Total production of whole fresh cow's milk. 
Source: FAO (1986a) and FAO (1987) for 1983 figures.  
Beef accounts for 41% (by weight) of total meat production in the selected countries. It is 
followed in importance by goat meat (12%) and mutton (11%). Domestic milk production is also 
important, but Sudan alone accounts for over 50% of total milk production in these countries 
(Table 2). When products are weighted by equivalent border prices, the value of beef is the 
highest, followed by milk, mutton and goat meat respectively.  
Aggregate meat shares, however, conceal important country variations in production. The share 
of beef in total meat output varies among countries from 29 to 64%. For goat meat the share is 4 
to 16% and for mutton and lamb, 1 to 18%. The share of beef is high and about equal in Sudan 
and Zimbabwe despite enormous differences in production systems. Goat meat share is high in 
Nigeria and Mali but very low in Zimbabwe and Côte d'Ivoire.  
Trends in meat and milk production  
Per capita meat production levels appear in Table 3. In spite of the limitations of the production 
data from which these estimates are derived, the ratios do provide an indication of relative 
change over time. Per capita beef production declined over the period 1971–73 to 1983–85 in all 
the selected countries, except Sudan. During the 1971–73 to 1977–79 period, only two countries, 
Mali and Sudan, showed a slight increase in per capita production of goat meat, lamb and mutton 
though this declined by 1983–85. Total meat production per caput increased modestly in two 
countries, remained about constant in one and declined in three.  
Table 3. Annual average production of meat by country, selected periods (kg per capita).  
Country 
Beef  Sheep and goat meat  All meat  
1971–3  1977–9  1983–5  1971–3  1977–9  1983–5  1971–3  1977–9  1983–5  
Côte d'Ivoire  7.6  4.5  4.3  1.8  1.4  1.2  16.4  13.5  12.8  
Ethiopia  8.0  6.8  5.1  5.2  4.3  3.6  18.6  16.5  13.2  
Mali  7.4  6.4  7.3  4.6  6.7  6.0  17.9  18.8  18.4  
Nigeria  3.1  2.7  2.5  2.0  1.9  1.8  8.2  8.2  8.5  
Sudan  9.5  11.2  14.5  5.1  6.7  6.2  19.3  22.4  24.6  
Zimbabwe  18.8  14.9  9.5  1.4  1.0  0.6  25.1  20.7  14.8  
SSA  5.8  5.6  4.8  2.2  2.3  2.1  12.3  12.3  11.5  
Sources: Meat production data from FAO (1987, 1989); Human population data from World 
Bank Atlas (various years) and FAO (1989).  
Per capita milk production also varied from country to country over the 12 year period 1971–73 
to 1983–85 (Table 4). In one country, there was a substantial increase in production, while per 
caput milk production either declined or remained constant in the remaining countries. The 
underlying causes of these different production performances are varied, but may include natural 
disasters (e.g. acute recurring droughts) which reduce feed availability, access to external 
markets and government economic policies. The effects of government economic policies on 
production incentives are examined in detail in chapter 4.  
Table 4. Annual average production of cow's milk by country, selected periods (kg per capita).  
Country 
Per capita cow's milk production  
1971–3  1977–9  1983–5  
Côte d'Ivoire  1.4  1.3  1.5  
Ethiopia  20.8  18.6  14.4  
Mali  18.7  13.8  13.8  
Nigeria  4.5  4.1  3.6  
Sudan  47.6  58.2  81.5  
Zimbabwe  24.6  21.3  23.6  
SSA  16.4  15.9  15.2  
Source: Same as Table 3.  
The consumption structure  
Per capita levels  
Table 5 shows the level of meat consumption in the study countries. Total per capita meat 
consumption in 1983–85 varied from about 9 kilograms to 25 kilograms reflecting differences in 
meat prices, income, population and agricultural resources among countries.  
Except for Mali in recent years, beef is the principal meat consumed in the study countries. Beef 
accounts for between 54–64% of total meat consumption in Zimbabwe, between 48–59% in 
Sudan, and between 27–47% in the remaining countries.  
Although sheep and goat meat are widely consumed, their relative importance varies among 
countries. In 1983-85, the share of sheep and goat meat in total meat consumption was 36% in 
Mali compared with 6% in Zimbabwe. Overall, the meat products considered here together 
account for more than 50% of the total meat consumed in the study countries.  
Table 5. Annual average apparent consumption of meat1 by country, selected periods2 (kg per 
capita).  
Country 
Beef  Sheep and goat meat  All meat  
1971–3  1977–9  1983–5  1971–3  1977–9  1983–5  1971–3  1977–9  1983–5  
Côte d'Ivoire  7.5  7.0  5.5  1.7  1.6  1.3  15.9  15.9  14.5  
Ethiopia  7.1  6.8  5.6  5.1  4.4  4.0  17.4  16.4  14.5  
Mali  6.7  6.3  4.5  4.2  6.4  5.6  16.4  18.0  15.4  
Nigeria  3.3  3.3  2.5  2.1  2.2  1.9  8.7  9.6  9.1  
Sudan  10.3  11.1  14.7  5.7  6.7  6.3  21.3  22.6  25.1  
Zimbabwe  11.8  6.9  6.6  1.7  1.2  0.7  18.3  12.7  11.4  
SSA  6.7  6.6  5.2  2.6  2.5  2.2  14.9  15.2  12.2  
1.  Apparent consumption of meat, expressed in terms of carcass weight, is obtained from data on slaughtered 
production and trade in beef, sheep and goat meat (FAO 1985). 
2.  Figures for 1971–3 and 1977–9 are annual averages based on per caput consumption data from FAO (1985); 
1983–5 averages are from ILCA (1987b). 
Sources: FAO (1985) and ILCA (1987b).  
Per capita milk consumption also differs greatly among countries, from about 8 kilograms liquid 
milk equivalent (LME) in Nigeria to more than 80 kilograms in Sudan in 1983–85 (Table 6). The 
wide variation in milk consumption is partly explained by differences in dietary habits. As 
indicated later on in this chapter, the percentage of total milk consumed that is imported varies 
from about 5 to 89%, and imports have been rising rapidly in recent years.  
Table 6. Annual average apparent consumption of milk1 by country, selected periods (kg LME 
per capita).  
Country 
Per caput milk consumption  
1971–3  1977–9  1983–5  
Côte 
d'Ivoire  
11.0  16.6  14.6  
Ethiopia  21.1  19.4  17.1  
Mali  20.7  17.2  17.2  
Nigeria  8.0  11.4  7.8  
Sudan  48.6  60.2  85.8  
Zimbabwe  26.2  21.6  25.8  
SSA  18.9  20.7  20.2  
1.  Apparent consumption is defined as cow milk production plus net imports of fresh, dried and condensed milk 
expressed in liquid milk equivalents (LME). 
Sources: FAO (1987 and 1989); FAO Trade Yearbooks (various issues); ILCA (1987b) and World Bank Atlas 
(various years).  
Trends in meat and milk consumption  
Table 5 shows that between 1971–73 and 1983–85 per capita beef consumption fell in five 
countries and increased only in one, with the share of beef consumption following the same 
pattern.  
Per capita sheep and goat meat consumption which had risen significantly in Mali and to a lesser 
extent in Sudan in the 1970s, rose very little in the early 1980s in these two countries. In the 
remaining countries per capita consumption fell. The share of sheep and goat meat in total meat 
consumption increased significantly in Mali, but fell in all the other countries.  
Per capita consumption of milk rose in the 1970s in Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Sudan (Table 6). 
While the growth was maintained into the early 1980s in Sudan, it declined in Nigeria and Côte 
d'Ivoire over the same period. In all other countries, per capita consumption of milk was lower in 
1983–85 than in 1971–73.  
The annual growth rates of total domestic production and consumption of the livestock products 
considered here appear in Table 7. While growth rates such as those cited in Table 7 are only 
rough estimates, it would appear that increases in consumption have exceeded domestic 
production increases by a substantial amount, particularly for milk. The growing gap between 
domestic production and consumption is further confirmed by the net trade data presented in the 
next section.  
Table 7. Estimated annual growth rates of total domestic production and consumption of 
livestock products by country, 1971–85.  
Product 
Country  Production  Consumption  
Per cent  
Beef  Côte d'Ivoire  1.09a  2.45  
Ethiopia  0,30  0.90  
Mali  1.93  – 0.35a  
Nigeria  2.71  2.71  
Sudan  6.05  5.49  
Zimbabwe  – 2.57  0.30a  
Sheep and goat meat  Côte d'Ivoire  1.98  2.62  
Ethiopia  1.23  1.23  
Mali  5.44  6.15  
Nigeria  3.28  3.14  
Sudan  3.61  4.01  
Zimbabwe  – 6.24  – 5.40  
Cow's milk  Côte d'Ivoire  5.46  8.59  
Ethiopia  1.05  2.43  
Mali  1.71a  1.93  
Nigeria  1.83  4.01  
Sudan  7.38  7.70  
Zimbabwe  2.50  2.69  
Note: The annual growth rate has been estimated as a log linear trend by ordinary least squares 
regression.  
a.  The regression coefficient used to estimate the growth rate was not significant at the 5% level.  
Sources: FAO (1987), FAO Trade Yearbook (various issues) and ILCA (1987b).  
Patterns of international trade in meat and milk  
The diversity of trade in meat and milk in the selected countries is illustrated by the data 
presented in Tables 8, 9 and 10 for beef, sheep and goat meat and milk respectively. Live 
animals make up the bulk of meat exports which are directed mostly towards neighbouring 
African countries. Ethiopia and Sudan export live animals to the Middle East, and Zimbabwe is 
the only country that exports beef to the EEC under the Lome convention.  
With respect to beef, four out of the six countries were net exporters between 1971-73 and 1983-
85 (Table 8). Exports, however, declined in three and increased-only in one. The remaining two 
countries—Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria—have been net importers, The level of imports in the 
former has been nearly invariant over the past 15 years, but imports rose significantly in the 
latter.  
Table 9 shows that Sudan, Mali and Ethiopia have been net exporters of sheep and goat meat. 
Over the period considered, exports more than doubled in Mali and rose appreciably in Sudan, 
while Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria were again net importers. Trade in goat meat, lamb and mutton 
was insignificant in Zimbabwe.  
Trade in milk consists mostly of dried, condensed and evaporated milk imports. As suggested 
earlier, milk production in the study countries has been growing more slowly than demand. The 
result has been a substantial increase in imports (Table 10). In liquid milk equivalent (LME) 
terms, milk imports to the study countries increased by 10% a year between 1971–73 and 1983–
85. The rapid growth in imports has been stimulated by the availability of subsidized skimmed 
milk powder from developed countries which has been increasingly used as food aid. Côte 
d'Ivoire and Nigeria import more than 50% of the milk products they consume, Mali imports 
about 15% while the remaining three countries import between 5 and 10%.  
Table 8. Average annual trade in beef by country, selected periods1 ('000 tons).  
Country  
Exports  Imports  Net exports or imports (–)  
1971–3  1977–9  1983–5  1971–3  1977–9  1983–5  1971–3  1977–9  1983–5  
Côte d'Ivoire  0.0  0.1  0.1  36.5  41.8  37.9  –36.5  –41.7  –37.8  
Ethiopia  17.3  2.4  3.7  0.1  0.0  0.2  17.2  2.4  3.5  
Mali  21.9  15.7  45.5  1.1  0.3  0.6  20.8  15.4  44.9  
Nigeria  0.1  0.3  0.0  34.5  57.9  53.0  –34.4  –57.6  –53.0  
Sudan  7.8  2.1  3.4  0.7  0.3  0.4  7.1  1.8  3,0  
Zimbabwe  44.6  60.8  21.8  0.0  0.1  0.0  44.6  60.7  21.8  
SSA  254.4  212.7  153.0  164.3  196.6  270.4  90.1  16.1  –117.4  
1.  Trade data for 1971–3 and 1977–9 are from FAO (1985) and include meat and live animals in terms of carcass 
weight. To obtain figures for 1983–85, trade data on fresh bovine and canned meat (ILCA 1987b; FAO 1989) were 
added to the meat equivalent of live cattle traded. The latter was calculated using FAO (1986a) carcass weights as 
conversion factors.  
  
 Source: FAO (1985, 1986a and 1989); FAO Trade Yearbook (1985) and ILCA (1987b).  
Table 9. Average annual trade in sheep and goat meat by country, selected periods1 ('000 tons).  
Country  
Exports  Imports  Net exports or imports (–)  
1971–3  1977–9  1983–5  1971–3  1977–9  1983–5  1971–3  1977–9  1983–5  
Côte d'Ivoire  0.0  0.0  0.0  4.5  5.2  3.8  –4.5  –5.2  –3.8  
Ethiopia  0.6  0.2  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.2  0.4  
Mali  2.1  2.8  5.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.1  2.8  5.2  
Nigeria  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.3  3.5  3.1  –3.3  –3.5  –3.1  
Sudan  3.8  5.4  7.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  3.8  5.4  7.0  
Zimbabwe  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.0  0.0  –0.1  0.0  
SSA  43.2  60.2  37.5  16.0  15.6  17.8  27.2  44.6  19.7  
1.  Trade data for 1971–3 and 1977–9 are from FAO (1985); 1983–5 figures were obtained by adding up trade data 
for fresh sheep meat (ILCA 1987b) and the meat equivalent of live sheep and goats traded (in terms of carcass 
weight). 
Sources: Same as Table 8.  
Table 10. Average annual trade in milk by country, selected periods1 ('000 tons of LME).  
Country  
Exports  Imports  
Net exports or 














9  1983–5  
Côte 
d'Ivoire  2.5  1.2  1.2  55.4  121.7  129.5  –52.9  –120.5  –128.3  
Ethiopia  0.1  0.1  0.0  6.4  26.4  114.0  –6.3  –26.3  –114.0  
Mali  0.0  0.0  0.0  10.4  22.2  24.4  –10.4  –22.2  –24.4  
Nigeria  0.0  0.0  0.0  224.5  588.3  371.8  –
224.5  
–588.3  –371.8  
Sudan  0.0  0.0  0.0  16.8  34.5  93.0  –16.8  –34.5  –93.0  
Zimbabwe  0.3  2.3  0.7  9.7  4.5  18.7  –9.4  –2.2  –18.0  





1.  Trade data on milk include fresh, dried, condensed and evaporated milk and are expressed in terms of liquid milk 
equivalent (LME) using FAO (1978) conversion factors i.e. 1 kg fresh milk – 1 kg LME; 1 kg dried milk – 7.6 kg 
LME and 1 kg condensed/evaporated milk –2 kg LME.  
Source: FAO Trade Yearbooks (various issues).  
Policy implications  
Although the output, consumption and trade trends presented above need to be interpreted with 
caution, the underlying message is clear. Production of meat and milk in the study countries over 
the last 15 years has risen only slightly or has declined. The gap between production and 
consumption, which was very narrow at the beginning of the period, has widened significantly. 
As a result, there has been a growing tendency to meet demand, particularly for milk, through 
imports.  
Domestic production has been unable to satisfy demand due to a variety of constraints which 
include environmental and technological problems. However, a fairly wide consensus has now 
emerged which seems to indicate that the main causes are to be found in the incentive policies 
pursued by most governments (Schultz, 1978; World Bank, 1981 and 1983). Often these policies 
have run counter to the producer's interests, though such was not always the intention. For 
example, policies which place ceilings on meat and milk prices at the producer and retail levels 
or impose export taxes have been cited as inhibiting growth in production while subsidizing 
domestic consumption.  
The realization of an expanded and sustainable meat and milk production has also not been made 
easy due to the numerous goals pursued within the livestock sub-sector and lack of agreement on 
trade-offs between policies. For example, rural dairy production is labour intensive and the 
employment effects from its expansion can be substantial. For rural producers with relatively 
modest incomes, it can be reasonably argued on equity grounds that governments should 
consider protecting the rural dairy producers from concessionary imports. Yet, livestock policy 
goals, if they are formulated to provide "cheap" milk to urban consumers may lead to a different 
set of policy recommendations.  
Thus, understanding the interrelationships and conflicts between objectives and policies is a 
critical step towards designing and implementing more effective incentive systems. The multiple 
objectives of price policies and the trade-offs inherent in the pursuance of such objectives are 
examined in detail in the next chapter.  
 
3.    Objectives and instruments of livestock pricing policies 
in the study countries 
In almost every country, developed and developing alike, governments intervene in agricultural 
markets.3 In particular, all African states formulate and implement policies which affect 
agricultural and food prices. The reasons for government intervention in price determination are 
diverse and varied. This chapter reviews the multiple objectives of livestock price policies in the 
selected countries and analyses the main instruments employed to influence both producer and 
consumer prices. It examines the conflicts that often arise between objectives and assesses the 
appropriateness of some of the instruments in use. It concludes with a discussion on the variety 
of arguments that have been advanced to rationalize government intervention in pricing policies.  
3.  A distinction can be made between interventions due to market failures and interventions arising from other 
motives. The former set of interventions can be justified on theoretical grounds, but the general body of literature on 
the price policies of developing countries takes a very negative view of the latter. It is the latter set of interventions 
that are considered in this chapter. 
Objectives of livestock price policies  
Although there are several objectives of livestock pricing policies in the study countries, the 
many different objectives pursued in this field can be summarized under six headings viz: self-
sufficiency; export promotion; stabilisation and inflation control; government revenue 
generation; improved nutrition, and employment creation. The specific objectives pursued in 
each of the selected countries are marked in Table 11. While the objectives are, to a certain 
extent, mutually reinforcing, in a number of cases there can be conflict between them.  
Table 11. Major livestock policy goals in the study countries, 1975–85.  
Goal  
Country  
C. I.  Eth.  Mali  Nig.  Sud.  Zim.  
Self-sufficiency  X  X  X  X  X  X  
Export promotion     X  X     X  X  
Stabilisation and inflation control  X     X  X  X  X  
Government revenue generation  X  X  X  X  X  X  
Improved nutrition           X     X  
Employment creation     X     X     X  
Note: C.I. = Côte d'Ivoire; Eth. = Ethiopia; Nig. = Nigeria;   Sud. = Sudan; Zim. = Zimbabwe  
The following notes sketch the main features of the objectives listed summarily above.  
The self-sufficiency objective  
Of all the stated objectives, the basically consumer-oriented objective of attaining meat and milk 
self-sufficiency (or improved food security in livestock products) ranked as the most common. 
As Table 11 indicates, the objective is ubiquitous in the study countries. This is not surprising 
given the nutritional importance of meat and milk in the diet and, the domestic political risks 
associated with shortages of these products. Equally important is the desire to reduce dependence 
on imports in the face of foreign exchange shortages and unpredictable world prices.  
Ideally, the self-sufficiency objective could be achieved by following a production-oriented price 
policy. This was the approach followed by the Republic of Korea in the 1960s and particularly 
since 1970 with respect to rice. By raising the real producer price of rice and implementing other 
price-related incentive measures, Korea was able to achieve self-sufficiency in rice in 1977 and 
in the process the yield of rice per hectare outstripped that of Japan and the United States 
(Paukert, 1988).  
While similar policies could, in principle, be applied to the livestock sub-sector, this has not 
usually been the practice in SSA. In most cases, priority has been given instead to "cheap food" 
policies, and this has kept down the prices paid to producers as well as consumer prices. As will 
be seen later on in chapters 5 and 6, even in those instances where producer prices have risen, 
restrictive trade and exchange rate policies have been partly responsible for such increases.  
More importantly, judging by the production and consumption trends presented in the previous 
chapter, self-sufficiency in meat and milk has not been achieved for any considerable length of 
time in most of the study countries. In fact, the self-sufficiency ratio4 in meat and particularly in 
milk has tended to decline over the last 10 years, although there are considerable fluctuations in 
the ratio between countries and between consecutive years.  
4.  Defined as the ratio of domestic production to total consumption. 
Thus, while the Korean example and other similar cases appear to indicate that appropriate price 
policies can move a country toward the goal of self-sufficiency, inappropriate policies, on the 
other hand, can lead to outcomes precisely opposite to those intended or at least stated. At this 
point, it is important to note that most of the study countries, undoubtedly, possess considerable 
animal resources. However, there hardly exist any detailed analysis of the comparative advantage 
that each country has in the production of particular livestock products. Such studies, by 
providing a framework for assessing the advantages that a given country has in the production of 
a particular product, can give policy-makers an idea of the feasibility of achieving self-
sufficiency in meat and milk products.  
The export promotion objective  
This objective, which is associated with the desire of most governments to improve the 
contribution of the livestock sub-sector to net foreign exchange earnings, is another frequently 
expressed production objective of price policy. As Table 11 indicates, it constitutes an important 
aspect of the export diversification programme in four of the selected countries.  
Generally, the rate of growth of exports will depend significantly on the stimulus from export 
markets and on the incentives provided by domestic price and trade policies. However, even with 
a strong external stimulus, domestic price policies may still impede the growth of exports in 
several ways. First, it is fairly obvious that exports of livestock and their products will increase 
only if growth of production exceeds growth of consumption. This might require producer prices 
to rise to spur production and restrict consumption. But if prices are controlled at the producer 
and consumer levels this may discourage production and encourage consumption — the opposite 
of the desired effect.  
Secondly, the manner in which the state intervenes in export marketing can have a profound 
impact on the level of exports. In most SSA countries, export marketing is under tight 
government control, when not a state monopoly.5  These intervention agencies have been used in 
the past as instruments of taxation with often negative consequences for exports.  
5.  Among the livestock exporting countries considered in this study, government parastatals intervene directly in 
export marketing by purchasing and exporting livestock and animal products in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe, while the 
parastatals provide only regulatory and service functions in Mali and Sudan. 
In addition, inappropriate exchange rate policies can have deleterious effects on the development 
of the livestock export sector. Indeed, it has been argued that part of SSA's decline in agricultural 
exports stems from lack of international competitiveness due to overvalued exchange rates, 
export taxation etc. (FAO, 1986b; Oyejide, 1986). The relative importance of these direct and 
indirect price policies in promoting or inhibiting the growth of livestock output, including 
exports, in the study countries will be empirically examined later.  
The stabilisation and inflation control objectives  
The stabilisation objective can take two forms viz: price – and income – stabilisation. With 
respect to the former, the aim is to stabilise or minimise seasonal or year-to-year price 
fluctuations with a view to achieving both consumer and producer price stability. The income 
stabilisation objective, on the other hand, is basically producer-oriented. For instance, Nigeria's 
agricultural policy document states that one of the policy objective of the livestock sub-sector is 
"to improve and stabilise rural income emanating from livestock production and processing" 
(Nigeria, Federal Ministry of Agriculture, 1988). Virtually all the countries studied included 
price stabilisation objectives in their policies.  
A common mechanism for reducing seasonal fluctuations in agricultural prices takes the form of 
government purchases when seasonal prices are very low and sales later in the year when 
diminishing supplies drive up prices. However, mainly due to the perishability of livestock 
products, this kind of measure has not been applied in the study countries. Instead, reliance has 
been placed in countries pursuing this objective (e.g. Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Sudan and Zimbabwe) 
on consumer price controls. At the same time, pricing policies aimed at reducing year-to-year 
fluctuations have been pursued, particularly in Zimbabwe, to protect producers against losses 
caused by vagaries of the weather and price fluctuations in the world market.  
At this point it is pertinent to note that some economists have argued that what is of crucial 
importance to producers is stabilising their income, not stabilising the prices of their produce 
(Stiglitz, 1987). Their argument is that if price and quantity are negatively correlated, stabilising 
prices may actually exacerbate the fluctuations in income. There is some validity in this 
argument, particularly with respect to beef production, since other studies have established that 
the short-run slaughter response is almost always in a direction opposite to the current change in 
domestic producer price (Rodriguez, 1985; Jarvis, 1986).  
Turning to the inflation control objective, the underlying motive is that it is necessary to keep 
down producer prices in order to make exports competitive and to constrain consumer price 
increases which could put upward pressure on wage levels and the prices of manufactured goods. 
While this argument has some merit, the fact that is often ignored is that price policy alone 
cannot be used to keep inflation in check. The experiences of some of the countries studied 
indicate that price controls will fail to curb and may even exacerbate inflation. This happens 
when the prices fixed for meat and milk and other consumer goods are too low in relation to 
existing supply and demand. Scarcity of goods sold at controlled prices rapidly develops, and a 
parallel market is created with prices higher than would exist in the absence of price controls. 
Producers faced with unattractive prices shun or reduce their supplies to the official agencies and 
sell instead on the parallel market. As a result, the proportion of goods sold at controlled prices 
falls, while the proportion of parallel market sales grows, with an inflationary effect. Sudan and 
Zimbabwe have lately experienced this problem with regard to milk and meat respectively.  
The government revenue objective  
Another objective of price policy is to raise revenue for government development tasks. The 
principal source of government revenue is, of course, taxation. Trade taxes (e.g. import tariffs 
and export taxes) are commonly used in all the study countries. In Mali, for example, the World 
Bank (1975) estimated that export taxes together with other levies and fees (e.g. butchers' and 
cattle dealers' licences, slaughtering fees etc.) contributed about 6% of total public revenues 
(amounting to F CFA 11,612 million) in 1970-72. Apart from generating revenue, trade taxes 
also have an important influence on the prices received and paid by producers and consumers 
respectively. Export taxes on livestock products tend to lower domestic prices, while import 
tariffs tend to raise domestic prices. In addition, price policy has often been pressed into service 
to raise government revenue chiefly because most developing countries lack an adequate 
administrative base for imposing direct taxes. The main instrument in this respect is the 
marketing board, which purchases livestock products at low prices, and either resells them 
domestically or exports them, at higher prices. The difference, which constitutes the 
government's profit from livestock price policy, can form a significant addition to government 
revenue. The Livestock and Meat Corporation (LMC) of Ethiopia and the Cold Storage 
Commission (CSC) in Zimbabwe, were partly set up for this purpose. Unfortunately, over the 
last few years, the governments of Ethiopia and Zimbabwe have had to subsidies these agencies 
instead of deriving revenue from them. In the case of the CSC the problem arises partly because, 
apart from export marketing, the body is also charged with the responsibility of purchasing beef 
for domestic marketing. Up till 1983, Zimbabwe pursued a "cheap beef for consumers" policy. 
The beef purchase price policy of the CSC was directly linked with beef consumer subsidies. By 
using CSC's export earnings to lower the price of beef to consumers, the government was 
indirectly taxing producers while subsidizing consumers. Even here the export earnings of the 
CSC could have added to government revenue, but the government chose instead to use the 
funds to reduce the cost of keeping consumer prices low.  
The improved nutrition objective  
This objective plays a prominent part in the justification of pricing policies in two of the study 
countries (Table 11). Its aim is to increase the level of household consumption of animal proteins 
-on the face of it- a highly praiseworthy objective. Its implementation is, however, more 
problematic.  
Ideally, for this objective to be achieved, producer prices need to be high enough to provide 
adequate incentives to producers to expand output, and consumer prices low enough, or at least 
designed in such a way as to enable the poorer classes to benefit more than the wealthier ones. 
But a marked increase in the prices of meat and milk to encourage production can have a 
significant impact on the standard of living of urban workers, leading to demands for higher 
wages and creating inflationary pressures in the economy. Moreover, attempts to increase food 
prices suddenly, as in Sudan in early 1985, have frequently been the overt reason for strikes and 
riots. However, attempts to suppress consumer price increases through subsidies can put an 
enormous strain on government budgets, leading to increased government borrowing and a 
possible expansion in the money supply that in itself can be inflationary. Zimbabwe, for 
example, experienced problems emanating from escalating consumer subsidies in the 1970s and 
early 1980s.  
More importantly, the use of consumer subsidies means favouring the urban sector (rich and 
poor) at the expense of the rural population since such schemes are easier to administer in cities 
than in inaccessible rural areas. Also, if consumer prices are reduced by paying producers low 
prices, urbanites (rich and poor) again benefit at the expense of rural dwellers and this may 
discourage expansion of output. Thus this objective, meritorious at first sight, can be very 
negative from the efficiency and distributional points of view if adequate care is not taken in its 
implementation. In terms of concrete achievement, available evidence presented elsewhere 
(Williams, 1989) indicates that not much progress has been made toward the attainment of this 
objective in Nigeria. The situation is not largely different in Zimbabwe, the other country 
pursuing this objective.  
The employment creation objective  
The idea underlying this objective is to use price policy to provide rural employment through 
expanded livestock production, processing and marketing. The labour intensive nature of some 
aspects of livestock production (e.g. dairy production) suggests that the direct and indirect 
employment effects of output expansion can be substantial. Such rural employment opportunities 
can help to stem the tide of rural - urban migration and ease the pressure on social amenities in 
the cities. Further since average rural incomes are lower, and often several times lower, than 
average urban incomes, it is not surprising that governments concerned with long-run 
agricultural development are willing to consider using price policy to encourage more intensive 
livestock production systems.  
High producer prices that will provide an incentive for expanded production and innovation 
constitute a necessary condition for the attainment of this objective. As will be seen in the next 
chapter, real livestock producer prices increased slightly over the past decade in two of the 
countries pursuing this objective. Nevertheless, the evidence of an upward trend in real producer 
prices does not resolve the question as to whether these prices rose enough to encourage the kind 
of investment needed to create additional employment opportunities. Besides, other technical and 
economic policies pursued in some of these countries have tended to offset whatever incentive 
was forthcoming from rising producer prices. For example, in Nigeria beginning in the 1970s the 
government established a number of dairy processing plants near the major urban centres. The 
milk for processing was to come from associated government dairy farms and from local 
collection. However, inadequate purchase prices offered by the plants made local milk collection 
difficult and the plants started basing their production activities on reconstituting imported 
powdered milk which was cheaper than locally produced milk because of depressed international 
prices and the appreciation of the real exchange rate of the naira during this period. Thus, both 
internal and external factors have militated against the attainment of this objective. The picture 
just painted for Nigeria is not altogether atypical of the situation in the other countries attempting 
to implement this objective.  
Instruments of livestock price policies  
Before examining the conflict inherent in attempting to implement some of the aforementioned 
objectives, it will be useful to review briefly the instruments through which livestock price 
policies are applied.  
Although there is a variety of intervention tools for influencing livestock product prices, the 
main instruments in use in the study countries are summarised in Table 12.  
Table 12. Major instruments of livestock price policies in the study countries, 1975–85.  
Instrument  
Country  
C.I.  Eth.  Mali  Nig.  Sud.  Zim.  
Controlled producer prices     X           X  
Controlled consumer prices  X     X     X  X  
Input subsidies  X        X        
Consumer price subsidies                 X  
Import tariffs  X     X  X  X  X  
Import licences  X     X  X  X  X  
Foreign exchange allocations        X  X  X  X  
Export taxes     X  X     X     
Export licences     X        X     
Note: C.I. = Côte d'Ivoire; Eth. - Ethiopia; Nig. = Nigeria; Sud. = Sudan and Zim. = Zimbabwe  
As the table clearly indicates no single instrument is ever used alone in a country. Frequently, a 
number of instruments are used concurrently. Understanding the inter-relationships between 
instruments is of crucial importance in designing effective price policies. In what follows, the 
pricing instruments listed summarily in Table 12 are discussed under four major headings: price 
controls; price subsidies; import- and export-measures.  
Price controls  
Controlled or administered producer prices are used by governments in some of the countries 
studied to implement purchase price policies for basic food and exportable commodities. A 
complementary instrument, in the form of a marketing board, is usually employed in conjunction 
with price controls. Despite the great diversity of country situations, the basic approach is to 
establish fixed or minimum producer prices for the commodities under consideration, with a 
parastatal purchasing part of the total output. In determining the level at which to fix the 
producer prices, various considerations including technical, economic and political factors are 
often taken into account. An example of this basic model is provided by the producer price 
policy of Zimbabwe with regard to beef and milk.  
The parastatals responsible for the purchase and marketing of these two commodities are the 
Cold Storage Commission (CSC) and the Dairy Marketing Board (DMB) respectively. Both are 
placed under the control of the Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA). The producer price 
fixing process begins when the AMA conducts initial hearings with farmers' associations on the 
cost of production incurred within alternative commercial farming systems. Based on the 
submissions of the farmers' associations and on the trading accounts received from the CSC and 
DMB, the AMA makes recommendations on producer prices to the Ministry of Agriculture. The 
latter also holds meetings with farmers' associations to get their views on pricing issues. On the 
basis of these meetings; the ministry's own cost estimate of production; and on the AMA's 
recommendations, the Minister of Agriculture in consultation with senior officials then decide on 
the "appropriate" producer prices to recommend to the Ministerial Economic Coordinating 
Committee (MECC), which is composed of ministers from other related ministries. After 
considering the proposals, the MECC makes recommendations to the Cabinet. The final decision 
on producer prices is ultimately taken at the Cabinet level. The producer prices arrived at in this 
fashion are then implemented by the CSC and DMB through their purchases of beef and milk 
from livestock producers. In spite of the relative sophistication of the method by which producer 
prices are determined, the producer price policy of Zimbabwe with respect to beef and milk have 
been criticised on grounds of providing insufficient incentives to producers.  
There are variations to this basic producer price fixing process in terms of the relative weight 
given to economic and political considerations. However, some aspects of the same approach can 
be found in Ethiopia and to a limited extent in Sudan with regard to milk produced by the 
government sponsored Kuku Cooperative Dairy Production Scheme and in the cattle ranching 
and fattening operations of Société pour le Développement des Productions Animales 
(SODEPRA) in northern Côte d'Ivoire.  
At the other end of the spectrum, consumer prices set by official decree are also prevalent in 
most of the study countries (Table 12). This instrument is normally intended to check price rises 
in order to curtail increases in the cost of living and to make livestock products available to low-
income consumers at affordable prices. The consumer prices set in this manner are, therefore, 
ceiling prices. Frequently, a subsidy is involved as indicated, for example, by a Zimbabwean 
government policy document which noted that "for a number of decades past governments 
pursued a policy aimed at keeping the prices of basic foodstuffs, i.e. maize meal, meat ... as low 
as possible, whilst at the same time set producer prices at a level high enough to guarantee that 
consumer demand was met. Such a policy involved direct government intervention through the 
payment of subsidies to bridge the difference between official procurement prices and official 
selling prices since any increase in producer prices if allowed to be passed on to the final 
consumer would place an unacceptable burden on the majority of the population at the lower 
income level" [Zimbabwe, Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, 1988].  
While rationing appears to be an important complement to consumer price controls as it limits 
demand to the amount of goods available at the fixed price, it is not commonly used in the study 
countries. Thus, in the absence of rationing, consumer price control tends to be either ignored or, 
when enforced (at considerable financial cost to the government), tends to give rise to a parallel 
market with much higher prices.  
Furthermore, past experience in some of the study countries has emphasized the frequent 
tendency for controlled prices to be unduly rigid, raising difficulties when changes are required 
as it happened, for example, in Sudan in 1985. Also, consumer price controls can hinder the flow 
of good quality animals to domestic markets, especially during periods of limited supply, 
because butchers may hold back on purchases due to doubts about their ability to operate at 
reasonable profit margins. The net effect is to reduce beef supply in those areas where price 
control are enforced. However, price controls are increasingly recognised as the wrong 
instrument for providing cheap food to urban consumers and for carrying the main burden of 
anti-inflationary policies. For these reasons, as well as prodding by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, large-scale decontrolling is now taking place in virtually all of the 
study countries applying this instrument.  
Input and consumer price subsidies  
Input subsidies are an integral part of livestock price policy in two of the study countries (Table 
12). The motive behind input subsidisation is to provide incentives to producers, not by raising 
the price of their products, but, rather, by lowering their costs of production. Measures, which 
may include a full range of subsidies for credit, concentrate feeding, veterinary services, 
transportation and reduced import duties, are frequently designed to secure increased livestock 
production by encouraging the adoption and use of modern technical packages by livestock 
producers. In Côte d'Ivoire, for example, SODEPRA provides subsidised feeds, drugs and 
veterinary services to livestock producers in the northern part of the country.  
In Nigeria, immediately after independence, regional governments helped to finance the 
introduction and distribution of concentrate feeds to pastoralists. Also during the oil boom, i.e. 
1975–83, the federal government made credit available to livestock producers at concessionary 
rates to promote the purchase of new inputs. In addition, the government has encouraged 
commercial banks to lend to livestock producers by absorbing some of the risks involved in these 
investments through the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme. This scheme, which was 
established in 1978, guarantees the loans made by commercial banks to the agricultural sector 
and thus serves to lower the price of credit for those seeking to borrow to invest in food and 
livestock production.  
Moreover, the Nigerian government has sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to cheapen the price of 
land for livestock and agricultural production projects. The government's land decree of March 
1978 reserves for the state governments rural land not under active exploitation. A prime purpose 
of the decree is to make it easier for the state governments to acquire land for public purpose, 
including the implementation of large-scale grazing reserve and ranching schemes. 
Unfortunately, as argued elsewhere, these input price measures have not been totally effective in 
raising the level of livestock production in Nigeria (Williams, 1989). For the most part, these 
instruments have been manipulated to benefit the large-scale commercially oriented livestock 
producers at the expense of the small-scale pastoralists who account for the bulk of livestock 
production in the country.  
In contrast to input subsidies intended primarily for producers, consumer price subsidies 
represent a real effort to keep down the prices of food, including livestock products, consumed 
by the populace. The cost of this policy is borne either by agricultural producers, in the form of 
low purchase prices, or more often, particularly when purchase price policy and subsidy policy 
are separated, by the government. Once implemented, consumer subsidies are difficult to 
withdraw or to reduce substantially. However, because governments naturally attempt to limit 
this cost in one way or another, there are a number of differing subsidy instruments.  
The most general, i.e. untargeted subsidy, consists of subsidising the consumer prices of a few 
selected items, usually beef and milk, with no restriction on the quantity bought and open to 
everyone. All income classes benefit to the extent of their purchases of the subsidised 
commodities. More often than not, the urban population benefits most on account of their higher 
incomes and political clout. Such an untargeted subsidy frequently runs counter to the goal of 
equity, and may actually increase inequality. At the same time due to the extent of consumer 
coverage, it is an extremely costly policy which places a huge burden on the government budget. 
This policy instrument is used in Zimbabwe, particularly with respect to beef, and less explicitly 
in those countries (e.g. Sudan and Mali) where governments attempt to enforce consumer price 
controls.  
Another instrument that is also implicitly used in Zimbabwe is targeted subsidies which attempt 
to direct consumer subsidies to certain designated groups for whom low-priced food is essential, 
while containing budgetary costs. The containment of costs is being pursued indirectly through 
"geographical targeting" and "self-targeting". By geographical targeting is meant the location of 
retail shops in areas inhabited mainly by low-income groups. For example, the CSC in 
Zimbabwe has established a number of "tru-stores" (i.e. retail outlets) in high population density 
areas to provide consumers with low quality beef at affordable (i.e. effectively subsidised) 
prices.6  
6.  By 1988, 5 tru-stores had been opened in Harare and 7 in Bulawayo. The CSC is considering opening up more of 
such stores in the future (Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, 1988). 
The self-targeting approach, which relies mainly on the fact that different income groups have 
different food consumption habits, has also been advocated in Zimbabwe as a way of reducing 
the budgetary costs of beef and milk subsidies borne by the government. The justification for this 
lies in the fact that low-grade beef and milk consumers dominate the domestic demand in 
Zimbabwe. For example, a government policy document estimates that demand for low and high 
quality beef stands at 92 and 8% of total domestic demand respectively. The same document 
goes on to state that "our domestic market is dominated by low income consumers and is 
extremely sensitive to price changes". (Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, 
1988 p. 3). Similarly, sterilised milk, with a longer shelf life is more popular in the rural areas 
than fresh milk. Thus, subsidies can be concentrated on the dominant low-quality beef and 
sterilised milk consumed by the poor, rather than on high-grade beef and fresh milk consumed 
relatively more by the middle and upper income classes.  
Import duties and quantitative import restrictions  
Import tariffs are one of the traditional and most widely used instruments for raising the 
domestic prices of imports. They are used in virtually all the countries studied. They can be 
manipulated to give producers whatever degree of protection is desired by insulating domestic 
prices from international price fluctuations and from the effects of imports subsidised at their 
source. This is precisely what the government of Côte d'Ivoire has done to stem the downward 
pressure on domestic cattle and beef prices arising from imports of highly subsidised beef from 
the European Community (EC). Since 1983, the Ivorian government has imposed import duties 
of approximately 25% on beef imports from the EC in order to lessen the negative impact of 
such imports on domestic beef prices.  
These instruments are also frequently used for revenue generation and for discouraging the 
consumption of particular products. In Nigeria, for example, the 1961 federal government budget 
speech provided a justification for what was to become the future use of this instrument by 
claiming that tariff "increases were imposed upon goods consumed by the better-off classes of 
the community". The statement added that "no one could reasonably maintain that imported 
meat, butter, ..., constitute indispensable or significant items in the family budget of the low 
income groups which form the bulk of our population" (Federal Ministry of Agriculture, 1987, 
Annex A p.2). Thus, tariff increases were imposed to serve as an indirect consumption tax and to 
raise revenue for the government.  
Moreover, quantitative import restrictions, effected through import licenses, foreign exchange 
allocations, physical quota limits on imports and outright bans constitute another quick-acting 
and powerful instrument that is widely used in some of the study countries to protect domestic 
producers against competition from cheaper import supplies. These measures are also used to 
serve other ends. For instance, a 1988 Nigerian government policy document maintained that "to 
serve as an incentive for increased production, government's ban on the importation of beef and 
other meats will remain in force" (Federal Ministry of Agriculture, 1988 p. 26). However, a more 
powerful reason for the imposition of these measures which is rarely made explicit is the 
windfall gains that often accrue to those with rights to import licenses and quotas. In the case of 
Nigeria, it is now well understood that prior to the introduction of the foreign exchange market in 
1986, those responsible for trade restrictions together with those who had access to import 
licenses and foreign exchange allocations were able to gain from the rents implied by the price 
differential between domestic and world prices. Thus, a reasonable inference is that rent-seeking 
is at least partly responsible for the implementation of these import restrictive measures in some 
of the study countries.  
Export taxes, licenses, quotas and bans  
These instruments are widely used in the livestock exporting countries included in this study. 
They lower domestic prices and are frequently used to prevent local prices from rising to the 
international price level when the latter lies above the former. They are also used to ensure that 
domestic consumption targets are met before any surplus is exported. Thus in July 1986, the 
government of Sudan imposed a ban on livestock exports in order to satisfy domestic 
consumption. Prior to that time and beginning in the late 1970s, there was a 5% export tax on 
small ruminants and their meat products, while export duties of 20 and 15% were imposed on 
cattle and beef respectively.7 In addition to these taxes, a would-be exporter, amongst other 
things must obtain an export license, pay an initial export registration fee and subsequently an 
annual export registration renewal fee, and must also reserve 30% of the quantity intended for 
export for the domestic market. The official taxes and fees paid for exporting cattle originating 
from Nyala in western Sudan in 1983/84 are itemized in Table 13.  
7.  The export duties on cattle and beef consist, respectively, of a 15 and 10% export tax based on the free-on-board 
(f.o.b) value of export and a 5% development tax on each product based on the free alongside ship (f.a.s) value of 
export.] 
The specific nature of the taxes and levies imposed on the export of livestock and meat products 
in Sudan is not unique to this country. They are common in some of the other exporting countries 
studied, including Ethiopia and Mali8 While variable taxes and levies, as temporary measures, 
can improve domestic price stability, a long-term sustained use of these instruments inevitably 
reduces the incentives to producers and carries the danger of introducing significant price 
distortions which may be to the disadvantage of the livestock sub-sector in the long-run.  
8.  For a detailed account of the official levies on the export of livestock in Mali see Delgado (1980), p. 378). 
Having briefly discussed the objectives and instruments of livestock price policies in the study 
countries, the issue of economic and political trade-offs between objectives and the difficulties 
often encountered in achieving desired objectives through the chosen policy instruments are 
examined in the next section.  
  
 Table 13. Official taxes and fees required for exporting cattle in Sudan, 1983/84.a  
Item (Sudanese pound/head) 
Export registration feeb 11.70 
Export tax 81.92 
Development tax 27.31 
Clearance and seaport charges 8.00 
Health fees at the port 4.00 
Export service fees paid to LMMC 6.00 
Bank fees for foreign exchange transactions 4.20 
Omdurman market fees (including vaccination and quarantine 
fees) 
6.68 
Nyala market fees (including health and local taxes) 6.08 
Totalc 155.89 
In 1983/84 1 Sudanese pound = US $0.769  
a.  Cattle originating from Nyala in western Sudan. 
b.  Actual registration fee amortized and pro-rated over the number of animals exported. 
c.  Total levies may vary slightly between different producing areas due to differences in local market charges.  
Sources: Sudan. Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (1986) and Livestock and Meat 
Marketing Corporation Information Sheet No. 8 (1984).  
Trade-offs between objectives and pricing instruments effectiveness in achieving 
desired goals  
The review of livestock price policy objectives in the previous section has emphasized one 
central point – the multiplicity of objectives, both in the context of individual countries as well as 
for all the study countries as a group, with consequent scope for conflict and contradiction.  
In the first instance, the tendency for conflict between price policy objectives is indicated by the 
fact that, in at least 5 out of the 6 countries studied, the national policy included as objectives 
both the provision of producer price incentives and the stabilisation or lowering of consumer 
prices. The dilemma here is how to ensure cheap food, including meat and milk, for consumers 
without depressing producer prices to the extent that incentives for production and marketable 
surplus are jeopardized. Moreover, most governments want to safeguard the nutritional welfare 
of urban dwellers and poorer income groups, while at the same time trying to avoid the 
disruptive effects that rising and unstable livestock product prices can have on the cost of living 
and consequently on wage levels. In principle, with an appropriate set of pricing instruments, it 
should be possible to reconcile these conflicting objectives, but this is rarely done.  
This brings us to the second point which is that even when an apparently non-conflicting set of 
objectives (e.g. export promotion and employment creation) is chosen, attempting to implement 
them all through a single pricing instrument may create conflicts and inconsistencies. For 
example, if higher producer prices are used in the pursuance of the aforementioned objectives, 
this may encourage increased production with beneficial effects on employment and may even 
result in an exportable surplus. However, if producer prices are too high, domestic demand may 
drop and exports may become uncompetitive thus dampening the growth of output with a 
possible reduction in employment.  
A somewhat different issue is the extent to which the choice of a pricing instrument is dictated 
by primary concern for objectives of livestock policy, rather than for macroeconomic objectives 
largely external to the livestock sub-sector. For instance, a key macroeconomic variable for the 
livestock sub-sector is the exchange rate. As will be seen in the next chapter, until recently 
virtually all the study countries maintained an overvalued exchange rate which adversely 
affected the livestock sub-sector by shifting the terms of trade against exports and in favour of 
imports and non-tradeables. Governments often responded to the resulting trade imbalances by 
placing stiff tariffs or quotas on imports. However, the imposition of these same measures has 
been frequently justified on the grounds that it will bring about the realisation of self-sufficiency. 
But as explained above, the measures would have been implemented anyway to reduce the 
problems created by an overvalued exchange rate.  
Similarly, there is a potential conflict between achieving domestic livestock objectives through 
the price mechanism and maintaining an external balance. The traceable nature of livestock 
products and inputs implies that the choice of a particular set of pricing instruments (e.g. import 
tariffs/quotas, export taxes/subsidies and exchange rates) can have a considerable impact on both 
the performance and fortunes of the livestock sub-sector, the overall balance of payments and the 
growth of the economy. The point is simply that when pricing instruments are used to achieve, 
say, macroeconomic objectives, they may have an indirect effect on livestock policy objectives, 
but because they were not implemented with the latter in mind, inconsistencies may result.  
These problems are further compounded when pricing decisions affecting the same commodities 
or inputs are made in a variety of government departments. For example, as indicated in the 
previous section, it is not uncommon to find the producer prices of meat and milk being 
determined by the Ministry of Agriculture, while the Ministry of Trade and Commerce is 
responsible for fixing consumer prices. At the same time, interest rates for credit schemes and 
the foreign exchange rate that affects the domestic price of exports and imported livestock 
products, may be set by the Ministry of Finance or the Central Bank. Frequently, definite 
positions based on different criteria are assumed before the co-ordination of these pricing 
decisions are taken. In other cases, co-ordination is inadequate or non-existent. As a result, there 
can be confusion of objectives and the pricing instruments may be used in ways different from 
those originally intended.  
Altogether these problems raise doubts as to the degree of effective control that governments 
have in using the price mechanism to achieve some of their declared objectives. It is fairly 
obvious that several of the goals discussed in the previous section are conflicting, yet 
governments in most cases still pursue them. A question might be posed: why do governments 
persist in pursuing these goals through price intervention policies? This is the question that is 
examined in the next section.  
Reasons for government intervention in pricing policies  
Although there now exists a wide variety of arguments on why governments intervene in 
agricultural pricing policies, two strands of the debate are of relevance to this study. On the one 
hand, some economists like Stiglitz (1987) have argued that "to understand the nature of 
government interventions in agricultural markets, one must approach the problem from the 
perspective of the second best". The main problem is that most developing countries do not have 
the administrative capacity to implement an effective and equitable income tax system. As a 
result, the marginal social cost for implementing an income tax system may be unduly high. 
According to Stiglitz, failure to recognise this fact, i.e. lack of a first-best solution to revenue 
generation, has given rise to much of the controversy over state intervention. Thus, naive views 
advocating noninterference in free markets or even the more sophisticated view based on optimal 
tax theory that "government should not impose trade taxes" become untenable once it is 
recognized that the government has limited instruments for collecting revenue (implying that 
some distortionary taxation is necessary) and redistributing income (so that perhaps a way of 
improving the welfare of the poor may be through taxes on commodities consumed by the rich, 
with revenue so generated used to subsidize the poor).  
On the other hand, those in the public choice tradition like Robert Bates (1981) argue that 
misguided price intervention policies pursued by governments in Africa are the result of short 
term decisions made by rulers on the basis of political self-interest. For Bates, the impartiality of 
the state cannot be taken for granted. Rather, the elite controlling state power often pursues 
policies designed to maintain itself in power. He argues that policies which appear 
incomprehensible and irrational make perfect sense when viewed from this angle. Thus, price 
policies which exploited the rural sector in many African countries can be understood once it is 
recognized that farmers and pastoralists make poor coalition partners because of their limited 
political power, and resources extracted from them can be used to benefit the elite directly or 
strengthen its power by appeasing the better organized and more powerful urban population. 
Similarly, Ghai and Smith (1987) argue that government control over the agricultural marketing 
system (through marketing boards, import licenses and foreign exchange allocations) brings with 
it control over substantial resource flows, which governments may use for their own purposes or 
allow different groups or individuals to enjoy as a way of dispensing political patronage.  
Undoubtedly, the various perspectives in this debate on government intervention are valuable 
and need to be carefully scrutinized. Nonetheless, the wide variety of policies pursued by 
governments in the study countries and their different outcomes suggests that the relative 
importance of these explanations will differ from country to country. The evidence presented in 
this chapter on the objectives and instruments of livestock price policies provides an indication 
of the relevance of these different perspectives in explaining the behaviour of governments in the 
study countries.  
  
4.    The effect of price intervention policies on livestock 
producers and consumers in the study countries 
Having examined the goals of livestock pricing policies and the main mechanisms through which 
prices are influenced in the study countries, attention is turned in this chapter to an analysis of 
the official price data on livestock products. The price data are analysed with a view to determine 
how successful governments have been in meeting some of their stated objectives, and to 
measure the impact of price intervention policies on production incentives and consumer prices. 
The methodology used for the analysis is set out in Appendix 1. The sources and limitations of 
the data used and the constraints which they impose on the interpretation of the results are also 
discussed in Appendix 1. In what follows, we first examine empirical evidence on the real 
producer price of livestock products and the real border equivalent producer prices. Next, 
variations in the-two prices over time are analysed and nominal protection coefficients (NPCs) 
are estimated to establish the relative degree of implicit taxation or subsidisation of producers. 
The trend in real consumer prices is then examined and NPCs are also estimated for consumers. 
The chapter concludes by drawing out the implications of the results for livestock production 
incentives and for the effectiveness of governments in influencing prices to achieve their 
objectives.  
The real producer price of livestock products  
Real producer prices, obtained by deflating farm-gate prices by the consumer price index (CPI), 
provide a direct, albeit incomplete, measure of incentives provided to livestock producers when 
technology and prices for inputs are held constant.1 The incentives are transmitted through the 
cost of consumer goods as measured by the CPI and will generate income and work/leisure 
substitution effects as a result of changes in the real returns to labour.2 Viewed in this light, the 
incentive (disincentive) effect arises when the prices received by the producer exhibit a 
significant upward (downward) trend relative to the cost-of-living index as measured by the CPI. 
This means that producers receive an incentive when nominal producer prices rise faster than 
inflation and a disincentive when domestic inflation exceeds the rise in nominal producer prices 
and thus erodes the purchasing power of producers' income. In countries where producer prices 
are fixed, rising real producer prices will occur when official prices are raised much faster than 
inflation, possibly through liberalization of marketing and pricing policies. Conversely, 
infrequent or insufficient adjustments to officially fixed nominal prices coupled with high 
domestic inflation will bring about declining real producer prices.  
1.  For a discussion of the rationale and limitations of using the CPI as a deflator of producer prices, see Appendix 1.  
2.  In principle, it is possible to distinguish between three related kinds of price incentives to producers viz: 
incentives to encourage the substitution of work for leisure with the ultimate aim of increasing the output of a 
commodity; incentives to promote the production of a domestic commodity over other competing domestic 
products; and incentives to stimulate the domestic production of a commodity in order to reduce the volume of 
competing imports. The discussion in this section is limited only to the first kind of incentives since competing 
domestic products and imports are not explicitly considered here. However, the incentive system in a country may 
encompass all three kinds of incentives. 
The estimated rates of growth of real domestic producer prices in the study countries between the 
early 1970s and mid-1980s are shown in Table 14. Some caution has to be exercised in 
comparing results across countries and commodities. This is because for one of the study 
countries, i.e. Mali, a CPI does not exist. Instead, the food price index (FPI) has been used to 
deflate producer prices. Moreover, while similar time periods were used for beef and mutton, a 
slightly different time period was used for milk due to non-availability of data for one year in 
one of the study countries.  
Nonetheless, the table indicates that there were four statistically significant cases of increases 
and two statistically significant cases of decreases in the real domestic producer prices of the 
commodities surveyed. If the signs of the non-significant coefficients are examined, the table 
shows that on balance there was a general picture of upward movements in real producer prices. 
The pattern, however, varies among commodities even within the same country. For example, in 
Côte d'Ivoire the producer price for beef fell, while it increased for mutton over the same period.  
Real border equivalent producer prices (RBEPPs) were also estimated for the study countries in 
order to assess the opportunities available to producers through international trade and to provide 
a basis for comparison with real domestic producer prices3. For each commodity, the RBEPP 
was estimated by converting a world representative price into domestic currency using the 
official exchange rate and then deflating by the domestic rate of inflation. The estimate thus 
obtained provides an, indication of the real value of the border price in domestic terms and will 
vary from one country to the other depending on the rates of exchange and domestic inflation.  
3.  In general, the use of border prices as the point of reference in price policy analysis does not imply that 
international prices are necessarily "fair" or "equitable", but simply that such prices are measures of the alternatives 
available to a country under free trade. Thus, they provide a guide for the use of that country's resources (Johnson, 
1978). See Appendix 1 for a discussion of the method used to derive BEPPs. 
The rates of growth of real border equivalent producer prices are shown in Table 14. In principle, 
the lower the rate of inflation and/or the higher the rate of devaluation of the exchange rate, the 
greater will be the tendency for the RBEPP to rise in domestic currency terms. Conversely, 
countries with a high rate of inflation and a relatively constant exchange rate, i.e. countries 
allowing their currencies to become overvalued will show a rapidly declining RBEPP. Table 14 
underscores this latter point for all the study countries. As the table shows, RBEPPs fell in real 
domestic terms in all the countries studied. If this result is taken together with the fact that the 
real domestic producer price rose in some countries and fell less rapidly than the RBEPP in 
others (see also Figures l and 2), the implication is that the ratio of domestic producer price to 
BEPP will, at least, show a moderate increase in most of the study countries. This point is largely 
confirmed as we shall see later on in this chapter.  
  
Table 14. Annual percentage growtha in real domestic and border equivalent producer prices in 
the study countries, 1970–86b.   
Product and country 
Compound annual percentage rate of growth 
1970/72 to 1984/86 
Real domestic producer 
price 
Border equivalent producer 
price in real domestic terms 
Beef 
Côte d'Ivoire –1.3 –3.9 ns 
Mali –3.9 –5.3 
Nigeria 0.2 ns –4.6 
Sudan 5.8 –6.5 
Zimbabwe –0.2 ns –0.7 ns 
Mutton 
Côte d'Ivoire 3.3 –2.5 
Nigeria –0.7 ns –6.7 
Sudan 6.4 –1.6 ns 
Cow's Milkb 
Mali 2.4 ns –2.9 
Sudan. 1.3 ns –7.4 
Zimbabwe 4.0 –1.6 ns 
ns: not statistically significant at the 0.1 level  
a.  The annual growth rates have been estimated as log-linear trends by ordinary least squares regression. 
b.  For milk, growth rates were estimated for the period 1971/73–1984/86.  
Source: Estimated from data collected from the study countries by the author.  
  
Price variation  
At this juncture, it is useful. to examine a slightly different issue relating to the degree of price 
variability in the study countries. As discussed in chapter three, one policy objective that is 
frequently mentioned by most governments is price stabilisation. Table 15 gives an indication of 
how successful the study countries have been in minimising year-to-year variations in producer 
prices. Judging by the coefficient of variation, except for mutton in Côte d'Ivoire and milk in 
Mali, real domestic producer prices have fluctuated less than RBEPPs over the entire period 
covered. This finding is also partly confirmed by Figures 1 to 3. When the entire period covered 
is divided into two sub-periods, the above result remains largely unchanged With respect to beef 
in Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Sudan and Zimbabwe, in the period 1970–78, the coefficient of variation 
in RBEPP was at least four times higher than the coefficient of variation in real domestic 
producer prices (see Appendix 2). Further, if the variation in real domestic producer prices is 
considered alone, the results indicate that for beef in Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Zimbabwe and 
for mutton in Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria, the variation in domestic producer prices was higher in 
the period 1970–78 than it was in the period 1979-86. However, the opposite seems to be the 
case for beef and milk in Mali and for beef, mutton and milk in Sudan (see Appendix 2). For 
Sudan, part of the explanation for the higher coefficient of variation in real domestic producer 
prices in the period 1979–86 (compared with 1970–78) lies in the successive devaluations of the 
Sudanese pound which started around 1979 and continued for much of the 1980s. The 
devaluations which were necessitated by structural imbalances within the economy led to wide 
fluctuations in food prices, including the prices of livestock products (see also Umbadda and 
Shaaeldin, 1985).  
Table 15. Variability in real domestic and border equivalent producer prices, 1970–86.  
Product and 
Country  
Real producer price  
Border equivalent producer in 
real domestic price terms  
S.D.  C.V.  S.D.  C.V.  
Beef  
Côte d'Ivoire  55.0  10.7  171.5  42.8  
Mali  94.0  19.5  140.2  45.8  
Nigeria  0.7  23.4  0.4  25.1  
Sudan  0.3  39.3  0.2  67.3  
Zimbabwe  9.9  11.9  21.9  48.1  
Mutton  
Côte d'Ivoire  140.9  16.2  106.6  15.5  
Nigeria  1.2  22.4  0.5  29.8  
Sudan  0.4  34.3  0.1  36.0  
Cow's Milka  
Mali  31.2  34.7  34.3  23.3  
Sudan  0.1  18.5  0.1  33.5  
Zimbabwe  2.7  17.3  3.7  18.8  
a.  For milk, the period considered was 1971–86.  
Notes: (1) S.D.=Standard Deviation and C.V.= Coefficient of Variation 
(2) Nominal and real producer prices for the products and periods covered in this table are given 
in Appendix 4 tables 1 to 12.  
Source: Estimated from data collected from the study countries by the author.  
Overall, the results suggest that in comparison with RBEPPs, a certain degree of success was 
achieved in the study countries in minimising the year-to-year fluctuations in real domestic 
producer prices over the period considered.  
  
Figure 1. Comparison of real domestic and border equivalent prices for beef in some of the 







   
Figure 2. Comparison of real domestic and border equivalent producer prices for mutton in 





 Figure 3. Comparison of real domestic and border equivalent producer prices for milk in some 




 Implicit taxation (or subsidisation) of livestock producers  
As noted under the discussion of real producer price trends, it appears that a certain amount of 
incentive has been provided to livestock producers through the rise in real producer prices of 
some of the commodities surveyed. Real price trends, however, provide only a partial picture of 
the complex interactions of sector and macroeconomic policies on production incentives. To 
provide a better measure of the effect of price policy interventions on production incentives, the 
nominal protection coefficient (NPC) – which is defined as the ratio of the domestic producer 
price to the border equivalent price – can be used to assess both the level of taxation against (or 
subsidisation of) livestock production and the scope for increasing incentives.4 By comparing 
domestic producer prices to the maximum that could be offered to producers through 
international trade (i.e. border price less domestic marketing costs), the NPC provides an 
indication of the taxation (or subsidisation) rate for producers, and thus, a measure of the 
distortion of production incentives.5 A NPC equal to one would indicate that at the official 
exchange rate the producer is obtaining the equivalent of the world price and, in this sense, is 
neither being taxed nor subsidised. A coefficient greater than one would suggest subsidisation, 
while a coefficient less than one would indicate that governments are taxing producers of the 
commodity in question. Given the latter situation, the scope exists for increasing price incentives 
by raising the domestic producer price to the same level as the border equivalent price.  
4.  See Appendix 1 for the full derivation of the NPC.  
5.  While the NPC represents a simple and straight forward measure of price incentives (or disincentives), it suffers 
from the disadvantage that only the product price is considered, and not the prices of inputs. More complex 
measures such as the Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC) and Effective Subsidy Coefficient (ESC) which take the 
prices of inputs into consideration require data on farm budgets which were not available in most of the study 
countries. In any case, given the low level of purchased inputs in ruminant livestock production in the majority of 
the countries studied, it is most likely that the NPC will closely approximate these other measures. 
In Table 16, the estimated NPCs6 for the producers of beef, mutton and milk are presented.7 The 
results indicate that, except for beef in Côte d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe, policy measures in the study 
countries have implicitly subsidised livestock producers over the period covered. When the 
NPCs for beef and mutton are compared, the latter appear higher than the former mainly as a 
result of the higher domestic prices paid for sheep during religious festivals.  
6.  A major problem in estimating NPCs relates to the choice of an appropriate world market price to use as a 
reference price since a number of different world price series exist. A description of the world price series used for 
this study is provided in Appendix 1.  
7.  Since the NPCs presented in Table 16 were estimated using official exchange rates, it is to be expected that this 
will lead to a significant upward bias in the NPCs of those countries with overvalued exchange rates. 
In explaining inter-country differences in the NPCs, it is useful to distinguish between importing 
and exporting countries. For the livestock products considered in Table 16, Côte d'Ivoire and 
Nigeria are net importers. In the case of milk, all the countries considered in Panel B of the table 
can be classified as net importers for most of the period covered. In these circumstances, we 
would expect the domestic price for these products to rise in relation to the border price because 
of the increasing need to import to meet the domestic deficit. This indeed occurred to some 
extent in most of the importing countries, with beef in Côte d'Ivoire being the only major 
exception.8 If this fact is taken together with the decline in the real border equivalent producer 
price in these countries, we would expect the ratio of producer price to border price to rise over 
time for beef, mutton and milk in the importing countries. This expectation is largely confirmed 
by the results in Table 16. Figure 4 also shows the gradual rise in the NPCs for milk producers in 
Mali, Sudan and Zimbabwe.  
8.  Although the rise in the real producer price in some of the importing countries was statistically insignificant (as 
shown in Table 14), the sign of the coefficients suggest an upward trend. For mutton in Nigeria, the fall in the real 
producer price was small and statistically non-significant. 
  
Table 16. Average nominal protection coefficients for livestock producers in the study countries, 
selected periods.a  




1970–72  1977–79  1984–86  
Beef  
Côte d'Ivoire  0.99  2.24  0.97  
Mali  1.33  2.68  1.08  
Nigeria  1.52  2.59  2.27  
Sudan  1.18  4.33  3.01  
Zimbabwe  2.46  1.80  1.20  
Mutton  
Côte d'Ivoire  0.97  1.64  1.50  
Nigeria  2.35  3.50  4.12  
Sudan  2.39  3.64  4.51  




1971–73  1977–79  1984–86  
Milk 
Mali  0.36  0.61  1.21  
Sudan  0.51  0.60  1.32  
Zimbabwe  0.58  0.81  1.04  
a.  NPCs were estimated using official exchange rates.  
Source: Estimated from data collected from the study countries by the author.  
In Mali, which is a livestock exporting country, the real border equivalent producer price for beef 
fell markedly between 1974 and 1975 and remained at a depressed level until about 1981 (see 
Figure 1). The real domestic producer price also fell but not as rapidly, thus leading to a rise in 
NPC over the period covered.  
In Sudan, another livestock exporting country, the lucrative export market provided by the oil 
rich Gulf states and the frequent devaluations of the Sudanese pound from 1979 onwards 
indirectly led to a rise in the real producer price of meat products. At the same time that the real 
domestic producer price was rising, the real border equivalent price declined. The result was a 
substantial rise in the NPCs of beef and mutton over the period considered.  
With respect to Zimbabwe, a beef exporting country, the fall in the NPC for beef, particularly 
between 1984–86, was caused by a rise in the real border equivalent price coupled with a 
moderate fall in the real domestic producer price (see Figure 1). The rise in the border price was 
in large part due to Zimbabwe's realistic exchange rate policy during this period. Although the 
nominal producer price increased between 1984–86, domestic inflation increased much faster 
leading to a fall in the real producer price. The overall effect of the divergent directions of these 
two prices was a decline in the NPC for beef.  
Figure 4. Nominal Protection Coefficients (NPCs) for Milk Producers in some of the study 
countries, 1971–86 
 
For each commodity considered above, the underlying causes of annual changes of the NPCs 
may be analysed by a simple decomposition. A cursory glance at the equation used to derive the 
NPC (see Appendix 1) will show that three variables determine the value of the NPC. These are 
the nominal producer price, the exchange rate and the border price. Following Jaeger and 
Humphreys (1988), the NPC is decomposed using a difference equation which for small changes 
approximates the total derivative of the NPC's three components or sources of change (see 
Appendix 3). Examining these changes in conjunction with trends in real price changes can help 
to explain the underlying pattern of changing production incentives. The NPCs for mutton and 
milk in Côte d'Ivoire and Mali respectively have been decomposed in the above fashion and the 
observed changes are explained below.  
We examine first the NPC for mutton in Côte d'Ivoire which is shown in Figure 5 (Panel A). As 
the graph indicates, the NPC fell below one between 1971 and 1974, but rose to 1.84 in 1979 
before falling to 1.38 in 1982. By 1986, it rose again to 1.79. In general, there was a move away 
from taxation towards subsidisation of mutton producers during this period. The decomposed 
annual change in the NPC is shown in Panel B. In this figure, each set of 3 bars represents the 
decomposed annual change in the NPC due to the 3 principal components. The three, taken 
together, should roughly approximate the actual change in the NPC from the previous year 
(Panel A). The decomposition indicates that in all years, with the exception of 1984 and 1985, 
changes in nominal producer prices have helped to raise the NPC, with larger magnitudes in 
1976 and 1978 (see also Panel C). Rising international prices lowered the NPC between 1971–73 
and 1979–80. The lowering of the NPC between 1980–82 and 1983–84 was primarily as a result 
of nominal devaluations which have the effect of making international prices appear higher in 
domestic currency terms. At the same time that border prices were going up, rising inflation 
caused the real producer price to drop (Panel C), thus contributing to the fall in the NPC in those 
years.  
  
Figure 5. Annual changes in price incentives to mutton producers in Côte d'Ivoire. 
 
In the case of milk in Mali, the decomposition of the NPC shows that nominal producer prices 
remained unchanged between 1971–72 and 1973–75 with the result that changes in the NPC in 
those years were entirely due to exchange rate and international price changes (Figure 6, Panel 
B). The changes in the latter two variables were quite small and consequently the changes in the 
NPC were minimal. Between 1983 and 1984, a large nominal producer price increase helped to 
raise the NPC above the NPC values of the early 1970s. As Panel C indicates, there was also an 
upward trend in the real producer price around this period.  
Figure 6. Annual changes in price incentives to milk producers in Mali. 
 
Overall, what these decompositions have clearly shown is that the scope for governments in the 
study countries to raise incentives to livestock producers depends on a number of factors 
including policies affecting the formation of nominal producer prices, macroeconomic policies 
influencing the rate of inflation and the exchange rate, and international prices. While 
governments can act directly to influence the first three factors, only indirect action may be 
possible in the case of the fourth factor. For the two francophone countries considered in the 
above examples, the room for manoeuvre on exchange rate management is even limited given 
the fact that their currencies are tied to the French Franc.  
The consumer price of livestock products  
As discussed in chapter 4, one prime objective of governments in the study countries is to keep 
the consumer price of livestock products down in order to restrain the increase in the cost of 
living. The results in Table 17 indicate that, with the exception of milk, governments have not 
been entirely successful in this respect. Although there was a statistically significant fall in the 
retail price of beef in Zimbabwe, for meat products in general there was a rise in retail prices. 
The rise in Sudan was particularly rapid. Given the fact that in some countries official rather than 
market prices were used and because meat shortages at times led to the development of parallel 
markets with meat being sold at prices higher than the official ones, the rise in meat prices could 
have been faster than the figures in Table 17 suggest. Table 18 also shows that retail prices have 
not been particularly stable over the period covered. Judging by the coefficient of variation, the 
fluctuations in retail prices almost parallel those of producer prices. In order to establish the 
extent of subsidisation (or taxation) of consumers, NPCs were also estimated for consumers. The 
relevant results are presented in Table 19. In the case of consumers, a NPC of less than one 
implies implicit subsidisation, while a coefficient greater than one means implicit taxation. For 
meat products, the results in Table 19 show that in the period between the early and late 1970s, 
there was a gradual shift away from subsidisation of consumers to taxation. The taxation of 
consumers continued till the mid - 1980s in most countries; the only exception being beef in Côte 
d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe. This result is in agreement with the trends in meat retail prices reported 
in Table 17. Throughout the period covered, milk consumers were subsidised in Mali, but were 
implicitly taxed in the remaining countries (see Figure 7). The results thus appear to indicate that 
in the majority of cases, the objective of keeping retail prices down for the benefit of consumers 
has not been fully realised. The only caveat is that the NPCs shown here may overstate the actual 
level of consumer taxation since the official exchange rate was used to estimate them.  
  
Table 17. Annual percentage growth in real consumer prices in the study countries, 1970–86.  
Product and Country  
Percentage Growth Rate  
1970/72 – 1984/86  
Beef     
Côte d'Ivoire  1.9  
Mali  1.4 ns  
Nigeria  0.8 ns  
Sudan  7.2  
Zimbabwe  –3.9  
Mutton     
Côte d'Ivoire  –0.3 ns  
Mali  2.5  
Nigeria  0.5 ns  
Sudan  7.7  
Milka     
Mali  –7.5  
Nigeria  –4.4  
Sudan  –4.9  
Zimbabwe  –2.9  
ns: not statistically significant at the 0.1 level.  
The annual growth rates have been estimated as log linear trends by ordinary least squares 
regression.  
a.  For milk, growth rates were estimated for the period 1972–74 to 1984–86. The milk considered here is 
reconstituted milk in the case of Mali; condensed and evaporated milk in the cases of Nigeria, and fresh milk in the 
case of Sudan and Zimbabwe.  
Source: Estimated from data collected from the study countries by the author.  
Table 18. Variability in Real Consumer Prices in the Study Countries, 1970–86.  
Product and Country Standard deviation Coefficient of variation 
Beef   
Côte d'Ivoire 64.6 9.8 
Mali 79.6 16.9 
Nigeria 0.7 20.8 
Sudan 0.5 35.9 
Zimbabwe 22.4 23.1 
Mutton   
Côte d'Ivoire 114.8 12.9 
Mali 109.4 18.3 
Nigeria 0.4 12.7 
Sudan 0.7 36.4 
Milka   
Mali 40.6 36.5 
Nigeria 0.6 35.9 
Sudan 0.1 28.9 
Zimbabwe 2.9 11.8 
a.  The period considered for milk was 1972–86. The different types of milk considered in this table are similar to 
those in table 17 (see note under table 17).  
Source: Estimated from data collected from the study countries by the author.  
  
Table 19. Average nominal protection coefficients for consumers in the study countries, selected 
periodsa  




1970–72  1977–79  1984–86  
Beef  
Côte d'Ivoire  0.56  1.06  0.74  
Mali  0.79  1.84  1.12  
Nigeria  0.83  1.28  1.26  
Sudan  0.51  1.06  1.40  
Zimbabwe  0.98  1.18  0.59  
Mutton  
Côte d'Ivoire  0.98  0.87  1.11  
Mali  0.54  0.87  0.79  
Nigeria  0.83  0.95  1.15  
Sudan  0.80  0.95  2.02  




1972–73  1977–79  1984–86  
Milk  
Mali  0.78  0.72  0.59  
Nigeria  1.11  2.53  3.27  
Sudan  1.16  0.97  1.45  
Zimbabwe  0.88  1.16  1.06  
a.  NPCs were estimated using the official exchange rates.  
Source: Estimated from data collected from the study countries by the author.  
Figure 7. Nominal Protection Coefficients (NPCs) for Milk Consumers in some of the study 
countries, 1972–86 
 
Concluding remarks  
This study has examined the objectives and instruments of livestock pricing policies in a selected 
sample of SSA countries. A major objective of the study has been to provide a cross-country 
comparison of the effects of livestock pricing policies on production incentives. Based on the 
findings of this study, it appears that since the early 1980s there has been a reduction in the level 
of price discrimination against livestock producers in the study countries. This reduction in 
taxation has come about through the institution of a variety of direct and indirect policy measures 
and represents an improvement over the situation in the 1970s.  
However, there still exist an enormous scope for improving price incentives in the study 
countries. Ordinarily, some of the measures already instituted such as liberalization of 
agricultural marketing and devaluation can help to raise real price incentives. But these measures 
will have the desired effect only to the extent that they are not offset by increased domestic 
inflation. If governments are able through appropriate fiscal and monetary policies to reduce 
inflation, this can serve to support and strengthen the other more direct measures aimed at 
improving real price incentives. This implies that macroeconomic policies and direct measures 
designed to raise price incentives need to be closely coordinated if they are to provide maximum 
benefit to livestock producers. Ultimately, it is the effectiveness of such coordination that will 
determine the degree of success that governments can hope to achieve in their quest to maintain 
and increase real producer price incentives in the study countries and elsewhere in SSA.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Price data sources, limitations and estimation methods 
Data sources  
The time-series data on official and market prices that were utilized for the analysis presented in 
chapter four were collected from the study countries during 1988. Each study country, apart from 
Ethiopia, was visited for two weeks in order to confer with policy makers and scientists familiar 
with the livestock sub-sector and to obtain copies of existing documents and studies relating to 
the sector. These documents, amongst other things, provided the data that were utilized to 
estimate transport and processing costs in those instances where these costs were not directly 
provided by marketing agencies in the study countries. The data collected during field visits were 
also supplemented with published statistics on world prices, ocean freight rates, exchange rates 
and consumer price indices from a variety of sources including the FAO Monthly Bulletin of 
Statistics, ILO (1981 and 1988), IMF (1987), and World Bank (1986).  
Data limitations  
Although attempts were made to improve upon the data used for the analysis, there are various 
limitations to them. In the first instance, the producer price series available in some countries 
refer to intermediate market (i.e. market between rural and urban centres), rather than farm-gate 
prices. In such cases, various deductions may be required to arrive at actual farm-gate prices. 
These deductions relating to transport and marketing charges were made in those instances 
where there was sufficient information to do so. However, in other cases, rather than make 
deductions on the basis of inadequate information, no attempt was made to adjust the 
intermediate market prices.  
Secondly, the consumer prices used for the analysis refer to retail prices in the capital cities. 
Rural retail prices have been largely ignored and in any case were mostly unavailable. In some 
cases, official retail prices were used where market prices were unavailable. The use of official 
retail prices may, however, give a misleading picture as to the actual changes in market prices of 
the products considered. Overall, these limitations imply that caution needs to be exercised in 
interpreting the results reported in the text.  
Border equivalent prices  
Border equivalent prices, or world prices adjusted for transport, marketing and processing costs, 
were estimated to serve as yardsticks and to provide an indication of the extent to which 
domestic prices have been distorted by government intervention. For an imported commodity, 
the border price was computed by taking the appropriate international price and adding on to it 
ocean freight and insurance charges to obtain the c.i.f. price which was then converted into 
domestic currency at the official exchange rate. To this price was added handling, transport and 
marketing charges from the border to the domestic market to arrive at the equivalent market 
price for the imported commodity. From the latter, transport, processing and marketing charges 
from the farm to the market were deducted to obtain the border equivalent producer price at the 
farm gate. Algebraically, the border equivalent producer price at the farm gate for an imported 
commodity is thus:  
 
where:  
Pb is the border equivalent producer price at the farmgate 
Pw is the world price 
Tw represents ocean freight and insurance charges 
(Pw + Tw) represents the c.i.f. price which was converted to domestic currency at the official 
exchange rate 
Td represents handling, transport and marketing charges from port to domestic market 
Cd represents transport, processing and marketing charges from farmgate to domestic market. 
For an export commodity, the border equivalent producer price at the farm-gate was derived in a 
slightly different way. In this case, ocean freight and insurance charges were deducted from the 
world price to give the f.o.b. border price. From the latter, transport, processing and marketing 
charges from the farm to the domestic market were deducted and the value of by-products added 
to arrive at the border equivalent producer price. In symbols:  
 
where: Vb is the value of by-products.  
In all cases, the reference market was assumed to be the largest city - usually the capital city.  
However, the case of Mali deserves special mention. Although Mali was classified as an 
exporter, the border equivalent price for Malian producers was not estimated as explained above. 
The land locked nature of the country and the fact that Mali's traditional export market had 
always been Côte d'Ivoire necessitated a different approach. Thus, for beef and mutton in Mali, 
the border equivalent price was estimated by using c.i.f. price in Abidjan port rather than PW as 
the starting point of the analysis - the assumption being that Abidjan is the place where beef from 
Mali will have to compete with imported beef.  
Also at this point, it is worthwhile to briefly examine the world market prices used in this study 
as reference prices. Due to the existence of a number of widely differing world price series for 
livestock products, it is difficult to find a single price series that will be adequate for all 
purposes, i.e. that will take into account the specificity of meat grades as well as the diversity 
that exists between different types of exporters on the one hand, and between importers and 
exporters on the other hand. Nevertheless, to provide a common basis for comparison between 
countries, for each product considered in the study (e.g. beef) the same world price was used for 
all the study countries. This approach suffers from the shortcoming of not adequately recognising 
the regional trade flows among neighbouring countries (this was taken into consideration in the 
case of Mali as discussed above), but it is justified in the sense that it provides a common basis 
for comparison among all the study countries and reflects better the extent of distortion of 
domestic prices.  
Thus for beef, Argentinean f.o.b. prices for frozen boneless beef were used. These were 
converted into carcass weight equivalent prices for the estimation of border equivalent producer 
prices. For mutton, London wholesale prices for New Zealand lamb were used. Both prices were 
taken from the IMF Financial Statistical Yearbook. The world price for reconstituted milk was 
obtained as a composite of the prices of skim milk powder and butter-oil. Both prices were taken 
from various issues of the FAO Commodity Review and Food Outlook.  
The Estimation of Real Prices  
Throughout chapter four, real prices have been computed by using the consumer price index 
(CPI) to deflate actual producer and consumer prices. The CPI was used as a deflator of nominal 
producer prices in order to estimate the producer's real purchasing power and its incentive (or 
disincentive) effect on livestock production. For the same set of prices the producer price index 
(PPI) could have been used, instead of the CPI, to give an idea of the net return to livestock 
production vis-a-vis other agricultural production activities. However, the CPI was the only 
readily available and most consistent price series in all the countries studied. The analysis was, 
therefore, confined to the use of the CPI alone.  
The CPI published in the IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbook was used for each 
country, except Mali. In the case of Mali, a CPI did not exist prior to 1988. The ILO Yearbook of 
Labour Statistics, however, contains a food price index (FPI) for Mali and this was used to 
deflate nominal prices in that country.  
Real border prices were computed by deflating nominal border prices (obtained as explained 
above) by the CPI or the FPI in the Malian case.  
The Nominal Protection Coefficient 
The nominal protection coefficient (NPC) measures the extent to which domestic prices diverge 
from border equivalent prices. For producer prices, it was estimated as follows:  
 
where:  
Pd is the domestic producer price; and 
Pb is the border equivalent producer price computed as explained above. 
  
Appendix 2. Variability in real domestic and border equivalent 
producer prices 
Panel A 1970–78  
Product and 
country  
Real domestic producer 
price  
Border equivalent producer price in real 
domestic terms  
S.D.  C.V.  S.D.  C.V.  
Beef  
Côte d'Ivoire 54.6  10.1  215.3  49.2  
Mali 61.2  11.2  168.6  47.8  
Nigeria 0.9  28.5  0.4  22.8  
Sudan 0.1  9.5  0.3  71.4  
Zimbabwe 10.8  13.1  22.5  53.8  
Mutton  
Côte d'Ivoire 149.2  18.9  106.6  14.4  
Nigeria 1.3  23.8  0.4  17.1  
Sudan 0.1  9.5  0.2  43.4  
Cow's Milka  
Mali 7.5  9.9  43.3  26.7  
Sudan 0.1  13.1  0.1  20.1  
Zimbabwe 0.7  5.5  5.0  24.3  
Panel B 1979–86  
Beef  
Côte d'Ivoire 37.9  7.8  102.7  28.6  
Mali 66.9  16.3  81.6  32.1  
Nigeria 0.5  17.2  0.3  19.7  
Sudan 0.3  35.2  0.1  14.8  
Zimbabwe 9.4  11.2  21.9  43.8  
Mutton  
Côte d'Ivoire 40.2  4.2  67.1  10.8  
Nigeria 0.9  18.6  0.3  25.2  
Sudan 0.4  26.3  0.1  24.4  
Cow's Milk 
Mali 39.8  38.3  10.3  7.8  
Sudan 0.1  22.7  0.1  21.1  
Zimbabwe 2.2  12.2  2.0  10.3  
S.D. - Standard Deviation and C.V. - Coefficient of Variation  
a.  For milk, the period considered was 1971–78  
Source: Estimated from data collected from the study countries. 
  
Appendix 3. Decomposition of the NPC 
The annual change in the nominal protection coefficient (NPC) can be decomposed into its 
component parts using a difference equation (Jaeger and Humphreys, 1988). If we start with the 
basic NPC equation, i.e.  
 
where is the domestic producer price for a given commodity,  
Et is the official exchange rate, and is the border equivalent price for the commodity, all for 
period t. The total derivative for the above is :  
 
which for small changes is approximated with first differences by:  
 
                                                    
 
  
Appendix 4. Tables on nominal and real producer and consumer 
prices and border equivalent prices in some of the study countries, 
1970–86. 
Table 1. Nominal producer prices for beef in the study countries, 1970–86.  
Year  
Côte d'Ivoire  Mali  Nigeria  Sudan  Zimbabwe  
CFA/kg cw  CFA/kg cw  Naira/kg cw  Pound/kg cw  Cents/kg cw  
1970  146  155  0.52  0.09  35.66  
1971  156  176  0.57  0.12  36.76  
1972  177  201  0.63  0.12  40.38  
1973  198  229  0.82  0.14  49.35  
1974  219  254  1.05  0.15  56.82  
1975  271  288  1.86  0.24  58.96  
1976  332  291  2.30  0.25  57.00  
1977  338  328  2.82  0.24  57.91  
1978  417  348  2.86  0.32  57.26  
1979  433  407  3.30  0.87  70.46  
1980  520  473  3.30  0.90  81.11  
1981  558  456  3.78  1.00  102.08  
1982  594  483  3.95  1.18  129.19  
1983  604  509  4.68  1.67  130.42  
1984  520  444  5.31  1.46  147.98  
1985  604  486  5.36  1.66  153.30  
1986  667  658  8.82  6.57  179.83  
Sources: Côte d'Ivoire - Ministère de la Production Animale (1983, 1987)  
Mali - OMBEVI. Statistiques du bétail et de la viande (various issues)  
Nigeria - Nig. Livestock Information Service (various issues) and FLD (computer printouts)  
Sudan - Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (1985) and LMMC (computer printouts)  
Zimbabwe - Agric. Marketing Authority (1980,1986)  
Table 2. Real producer prices for beef in the study countries, 1970–86.  
Year  
Côte d'Ivoire  Mali  Nigeria  Sudan  Zimbabwe  
CFA/kg cw  CFA/kg cw  Naira/kg cw  Pound/kg cw  Cents/kg cw  
1970  452.15  591.66  2.18  0.43  73.68  
1971  490.57  558.97  2.06  0.55  73.67  
1972  554.69  591.70  2.22  0.50  78.71  
1973  558.69  521.87  2.73  0.49  93.29  
1974  526.57  567.22  3.11  0.44  100.74  
1975  584.68  606.95  4.12  0.55  94.94  
1976  639.08  568.17  4.18  0.56  82.73  
1977  510.73  511.70  4.22  0.48  76.20  
1978  557.56  407.49  3.51  0.53  71.31  
1979  496.50  496.95  3.63  1.09  74.25  
1980  520.00  473.00  3.30  0.90  81.11  
1981  512.73  406.60  3.13  0.80  90.18  
1982  508.52  420.51  3.04  0.75  103.19  
1983  488.36  403.89  2.92  0.81  84.63  
1984  403.13  312.68  2.37  0.53  79.90  
1985  459.77  316.62  2.27  0.42  76.31  
1986  476.05  448.84  3.70  1.34  78.29  
Note: The consumer price indices used to deflate actual prices have 1980 as the base year, thus, 
all prices in the table are in terms of 1980 values.  
Sources: Same as Table 1 and ILO (1981, 1988), IMF (1987).  
Table 3. Border equivalent producer prices for beef in the study countries, 1970–86.  
Year  
Côte d'Ivoire  Mali  Nigeria  Sudan  Zimbabwe  
CFA/kg cw  CFA/kg cw  Naira/kg cw  Pound/kg cw  Cents/kg cw  
1970  131.27  103.88  0.31  0.06  10.51  
1971  164.68  135.96  0.38  0.09  15.97  
1972  194.74  165.21  0.46  0.14  23.84  
1973  243.13  208.47  0.70  0.21  37.31  
1974  319.05  280.38  0.76  0.23  48.31  
1975  111.59  91.64  0.75  0.05  12.75  
1976  134.95  111.46  0.88  0.06  17.54  
1977  172.56  137.42  1.03  0.06  26.82  
1978  141.57  112.09  1.06  0.08  30.71  
1979  236.66  159.27  1.40  0.17  51.03  
1980  242.38  151.80  1.39  0.20  40.76  
1981  273.45  173.84  1.40  0.23  42.72  
1982  390.38  285.17  1.66  0.29  34.78  
1983  459.56  346.78  1.84  0.43  44.57  
1984  623.92  503.14  2.18  0.68  85.92  
1985  665.94  540.27  2.45  0.79  174.22  
1986  576.54  447.64  4.05  1.38  180.71  
Note: Border prices have been converted at official exchange rates  
Sources: IMF (1987), World Bank (1986) and data collected from the study countries.  
Table 4. Real border equivalent producer prices for beef in the study countries, 1970–86.  
Year  
Côte d'Ivoire  Mali  Nigeria  Sudan  Zimbabwe  
CFA/kg cw  CFA/kg cw  Naira/kg cw  Pound/kg cw  Cents/kg cw  
1970  406.53  397.55  1.29  0.29  21.71  
1971  517.86  431.07  1.38  0.44  32.00  
1972  610.28  486.34  1.62  0.59  46.47  
1973  686.03  474.87  2.34  0.75  70.53  
1974  767.13  625.71  2.24  0.65  85.66  
1975  240.76  193.13  1.66  0.11  20.53  
1976  259.77  217.40  1.59  0.13  25.46  
1977  260.74  214.38  1.55  0.12  35.29  
1978  189.29  131.25  1.31  0.14  38.24  
1979  271.37  194.47  1.54  0.21  53.77  
1980  242.38  151.80  1.40  0.20  40.76  
1981  251.26  154.94  1.16  0.19  37.74  
1982  334.20  248.41  1.28  0.19  27.78  
1983  371.57  275.00  1.15  0.21  28.92  
1984  483.70  354.32  0.97  0.25  46.39  
1985  506.92  352.20  1.04  0.20  86.72  
1986  411.49  305.35  1.70  0.28  78.67  
Notes: (i) Border prices have been converted at official exchange rates. 
 (ii) The consumer price indices used to deflate nominal border prices have 1980 as the base 
year, thus, all prices in the table are in terms of 1980 values. 
Sources: Same as Table 3 and ILO (1981,1988).  
Table 5. Nominal producer prices for mutton in the study countries, 1970–86.  
Year  
Côte d'Ivoire  Nigeria  Sudan  
CFA/kg cw  Naira/kg cw  Pound/kg cw  
1970  200  1.05  0.18  
1971  230  1.16  0.20  
1972  244  1.28  0.22  
1973  260  1.15  0.23  
1974  280  1.94  0.24  
1975  305  2.93  0.38  
1976  480  4.03  0.35  
1977  600  4.67  0.41  
1978  800  5.20  0,58  
1979  900  5.36  1.19  
1980  1000  5.36  1.46  
1981  1050  5.25  1.67  
1982  1100  5.64  2.01  
1983  1200  8.77  3.34  
1984  1200  8.88  2.83  
1985  1200  8.36  3.73  
1986  1300  14.19  10.49  
Sources: Côte d'Ivoire - Ministère de la Production Animale (1983,1987)  
Nigeria - Nig. Livestock Information Service (various issues) and FLD (computer printouts)  
Sudan - Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (1985) and LMMC (computer printouts)  
  
Table 6. Real producer prices for mutton in the study countries, 1970–86.  
Year  
Côte d'Ivoire  Nigeria  Sudan  
CFA/kg cw  Naira/kg cw  Pound/kg cw  
1970  619.39  4.41  0.84  
1971  723.27  4.20  0.94  
1972  764.65  4.51  0.91  
1973  733.63  3.83  0.85  
1974  673.24  5.74  0.69  
1975  658.04  6.49  0.89  
1976  923.96  7.32  0.80  
1977  906.62  6.98  0.81  
1978  1069.66  6.39  0.95  
1979  1031.99  5.89  1.49  
1980  1000.00  5.36  1.46  
1981  964.81  4.35  1.34  
1982  941.70  4.33  1.29  
1983  970.25  5.47  1.63  
1984  930.30  3.97  1.03  
1985  913.45  3.54  0.93  
1986  927.84  5.95  2.13  
Note: The consumer price indices used to deflate actual prices have 1980 as the base year, thus, 
all prices in the table are in terms of 1980 values.  
Sources: Same as Table 5 and ILO (1981,1988) and IMF (1987).  
Table 7. Border equivalent producer prices for mutton in the study countries, 1970–86.  
Year  
Côte d'Ivoire  Nigeria  Sudan  
CFA/kg cw  Naira/kg cw  Pound/kg cw  
1970  204.22  0.43  0.06  
1971  223.54  0.47  0.07  
1972  271.66  0.59  0.14  
1973  320.84  0.86  0.20  
1974  361.79  0.82  0.14  
1975  321.49  1.05  0.10  
1976  382.26  1.12  0.12  
1977  418.26  1.25  0.11  
1978  488.18  1.56  0.24  
1979  488.35  1.57  0.25  
1980  581.57  1.70  0.48  
1981  743.55  1.86  0.37  
1982  791.39  1.78  0.64  
1983  745.54  1.78  0.76  
1984  894.54  1.93  0.59  
1985  884.28  2.19  1.09  
1986  723.49  3.58  1.96  
Note: Border prices have been converted at official exchange rates.  
Sources: IMF (1987), World Bank (1986) and data collected from the study countries.  
Table 8. Real border equivalent producer prices for mutton in the study countries, 1970–86.  
Year  
Côte d'Ivoire  Nigeria  Sudan  
CFA/kg cw  Naira/kg cw  Pound/kg cw  
1970  632.46  1.82  0.29  
1971  702.96  1.70  0.35  
1972  851.33  2.09  0.58  
1973  905.30  2.85  0.72  
1974  869.90  2.41  0.40  
1975  693.61  2.32  0.24  
1976  735.82  2.03  0.28  
1977  632.00  1.86  0.21  
1978  652.73  1.92  0.40  
1979  559.97  1.73  0.32  
1980  581.57  1.70  0.48  
1981  683.22  1.54  0.30  
1982  677.50  1.37  0.41  
1983  602.80  1.11  0.37  
1984  693.50  0.86  0.22  
1985  673.12  0.93  0.27  
1986  516.37  1.50  0.40  
Notes: (i) Border prices have been converted at official exchange rates.  
(ii) The consumer price indices used to deflate nominal border prices have 1980 as the base year, thus, all prices in the table are in terms 
of 1980 values. 
Sources: Same as Table 7.  
Table 9. Nominal producer prices for milk in the study countries, 1971–86.  
Year  
Mali  Sudan  Zimbabwe  
CFA/kg  Pound/kg  Cent/kg  
1971  24.27  0.05  6.58  
1972  24.27  0.05  6.71  
1973  36.41  0.06  7.18  
1974  36.41  0.06  7.31  
1975  36.41  0.10  8.72  
1976  43.69  0.10  10.33  
1977  43.69  0.10  10.16  
1978  54.37  0.10  10.16  
1979  63.11  0.10  12.96  
1980  63.11  0.29  15.54  
1981  72.82  0.29  20.55  
1982  108.01  0.29  25.22  
1983  101.94  0.58  30.38  
1984  201.94  0.58  33.43  
1985  231.07  0.87  38.12  
1986  231.07  1.07  40.96  
Sources: Mali - ULB (personal communication)  
Sudan - Animal Production Corp. and Kuku Dairy Production Cooperative (personal 
communication)  
Zimbabwe - Agric. Marketing Authority (1980,1986)  
Table 10. Real producer prices for milk in the study countries, 1971–86.  
Year 
Mali  Sudan  Zimbabwe  
CFA/kg  Pound/kg  Cent/kg  
1971  76.95  0.23  13.19  
1972  71.44  0.20  13.08  
1973  82.94  0.22  13.57  
1974  81.25  0.17  12.96  
1975  76.73  0.24  14.04  
1976  85.22  0.23  14.99  
1977  68.16  0.20  13.37  
1978  63.66  0.17  12.65  
1979  77.06  0.13  13.66  
1980  63.11  0.29  15.54  
1981  64.90  0.23  18.15  
1982  94.08  0.19  20.14  
1983  80.84  0.28  19.71  
1984  142.21  0.21  18.05  
1985  150.63  0.22  18.97  
1986  157.62  0.22  17.83  
Note: The consumer price indices used to deflate actual prices have 1980 as the base year, thus, 
all prices in the table are in terms of 1980 values.  
Sources: Same as Table 9 and ILO (1981,1988), IMF (1987).  
Table 11. Border equivalent producer prices for milk in the study countries, 1971–86.  
Year 
Mali  Sudan  Zimbabwe  
CPA/kg  Pound/kg  Cents/kg  
1971  63.63  0,08  10.48  
1972  71.29  0.10  12.74  
1973  79.20  0.12  13.20  
1974  90.40  0.15  15.19  
1975  77.02  0.16  13.85  
1976  65.17  0.13  10.15  
1977  75.31  0.15  11.03  
1978  83.42  0.16  12.63  
1979  104.33  0.20  18.13  
1980  131.63  0.27  23.05  
1981  153.33  0.30  23.48  
1982  162.52  0.39  23.47  
1983  177.44  0.47  28.77  
1984  194.85  0.47  31.99  
1985  197.27  0.68  38.14  
1986  160.71  0.75  38.55  
Note: Border prices have been converted at official exchange rates.  
Sources: FAO Commodity Review and Outlook (1981-82), FAO Food Outlook (various issues), 
World Bank(1986) and data collected from the sudy countries.  
Table 12. Real border equivalent producer prices for milk in the study countries, 1971–86.  
Year  
Mali  Sudan  Zimbabwe  
CFA/kg  Pound/kg  Cents/kg  
1971  201.74  0.40  21.00  
1972  209.86  0.44  24.83  
1973  180.41  0.45  24.95  
1974  201.74  0.42  26.93  
1975  162.32  0.37  22.30  
1976  127.11  0.30  14.73  
1977  117.49  0.29  14.51  
1978  97.68  0.26  15.73  
1979  127.39  0.25  19.10  
1980  131.63  0.27  23.05  
1981  136.66  0.24  20.74  
1982  141.57  0.25  18.75  
1983  140.71  0.23  18.67  
1984  137.22  0.17  17.27  
1985  128.60  0.17  18.98  
1986  109.62  0.15  16.78  
Note: (i) Border prices have been converted at official exchange rates.  
(ii) The consumer price indices used to deflate nominal border prices have 1980 as 
the base year, thus, all prices in the table are in terms of 1980 values. 
Sources: Same as Table 11 and ILO (1981,1988), IMF (1987).  




Mali  Nigeria  Sudan  Zimbabwe  
CFA/kg  CFA/kg  Naira/kg  Pound/kg  Cents/kg  
1970  177  138  0.66  0.17  44.00  
1971  178  138  0.71  0.17  44.00  
1972  190  138  0.75  0.17  44.00  
1973  215  138  0.74  0.26  65.00  
1974  247  150  1.18  0.30  73.00  
1975  307  300  2.03  0.50  79.00  
1976  345  300  2.76  0.46  87.00  
1977  441  325  2.84  0.59  90.00  
1978  539  400  3.14  0.30  95.00  
1979  550  425  3.58  1.26  80.00  
1980  650  500  3.76  1.66  86.00  
1981  800  550  3.97  2.28  114.00  
1982  900  575  4.71  2.57  114.00  
1983  900  600  5.61  3.60  125.00  
1984  900  600  6.70  4.17  125.00  
1985  950  650  6.60  5.29  132.00  
1986  950  687  9.50  10.08  151.00  
Sources: Côte d'Ivoire - Ministère de la Production Animale (1983) and SODEPRA (personal 
communication)  
Mali - OMBEVI Statistiques du bétail et de la viande (various issues)  
Nigeria - Nig. Livestock Information Service (various issues) and FLD (computer printouts)  
Sudan - LMMC (computer printouts)  
Zimbabwe - Agricultural Marketing Authority (personal communication)  
  
Table 14. Real consumer prices for beef in the study countries, 1970–86.  
Year  
Côte d'Ivoire  Mali  Nigeria  Sudan  Zimbabwe  
CFA/kg  CFA/kg  Naira/kg  Pound/kg  Cents/kg  
1970  548.16  526.21  2.77  0.82  90.91  
1971  559.75  435.95  2.57  0.81  88.18  
1972  595.42  404.77  2.64  0.71  85.77  
1973  606.66  313.21  2.47  0.95  122.87  
1974  593.89  334.75  3.49  0.87  129.43  
1975  662.35  632.24  4.50  1.17  127.21  
1976  664.10  585.14  5.01  1.06  126.27  
1977  666.36  507.02  4.25  1.16  118.42  
1978  720.68  468.38  3.86  0.49  118.31  
1979  630.66  518.93  3.94  1.58  84.30  
1980  650.00  500.00  3.76  1.66  86.00  
1981  735.09  490.20  3.29  1.83  100.71  
1982  770.48  500.87  3.62  1.64  91.05  
1983  727.68  475.81  3.50  1.76  81.12  
1984  697.73  422.53  2.99  1.52  67.49  
1985  723.15  423.73  2.79  1.33  65.70  
1986  678.04  468.62  3.98  2.05  65.74  
Note: The consumer price indices used to deflate actual prices have 1980 as the base year, thus, 
all prices in the table are in terms of 1980 values.  
Sources: Same as Table 13 and ILO (1981,1988), IMF (1987)  
Table 15. Border equivalent consumer prices for beef in the study countries, 1970–86.  
Year  
Côte d'Ivoire  Mali  Nigeria  Sudan  Zimbabwe  
CFA/kg  CFA/kg  Naira/kg  Pound/kg  Cents/kg  
1970  281.92  137.02  0.73  0.28  36.11  
1971  327.42  181.43  0.86  0.33  45.99  
1972  371.00  225.93  0.99  0.42  57.69  
1973  451.78  273.03  1.33  0.55  79.61  
1974  575.82  341.01  1.60  0.65  97.39  
1975  295.34  117.47  1.59  0.36  44.08  
1976  344.77  139.00  1.97  0.38  51.97  
1977  442.83  191.66  2.21  0.48  65.69  
1978  427.22  183.87  2.33  0.53  70.94  
1979  602.24  259.60  2.95  0.92  96.51  
1980  650.95  275.13  2.99  1.16  97.10  
1981  715.36  268.87  3.04  1.09  97.98  
1982  902.15  381.01  3.62  1.88  93.80  
1983  1017.69  447.65  4.11  2.52  118.57  
1984  1253.57  580.21  4.88  2.79  173.18  
1985  1314.83  609.92  5.21  4.81  242.11  
1986  1225.35  541.93  8.23  6.26  308.96  
Note: Border prices have been converted at official exchange rates  
Sources: IMF (1987), World Bank (1986) and data collected from study countries.  
Table 16. Nominal consumer prices for mutton in the study countries, 1970–86.  
Year  
Côte d'Ivoire  Mali  Nigeria  Sudan  
CFA/kg  CFA/kg  Naira/kg  Pound/kg  
1970  275  150  0.65  0.29  
1971  300  150  0.70  0.29  
1972  360  150  0.74  0.29  
1973  360  150  0.75  0.38  
1974  360  250  0.98  0.41  
1975  400  325  1.63  0.70  
1976  400  375  2.00  0.63  
1977  500  425  2.39  0.79  
1978  600  500  2.55  0.43  
1979  650  600  2.91  1.74  
1980  700  700  3.17  2.75  
1981  900  750  3.49  3.33  
1982  1100  775  3.97  4.03  
1983  1100  800  5.08  5.67  
1984  1300  755  5.65  6.57  
1985  1300  785  6.59  8.34  
1986  1350  940  8.11  14.73  
Sources: Côte d'Ivoire - Ministère de la Production Animale (1983) and SODEPRA (personal 
communication)  
Mali - OMBEVI. Statistiques du bétail et de la viande (various issues)  
Nigeria - Nig. Livestock Information Service (various issues) and FLD (computer printouts)  
Sudan - LMMC (computer printouts)  
Table 17. Real consumer prices for mutton in the study countries, 1970–86.  
Year  
Côte d'Ivoire  Mali  Nigeria  Sudan  
CFA/kg  CFA/kg  Naira/kg  Pound/kg  
1970  851.66  574.05  2.73  1.40  
1971  943.40  475.59  2.53  1.38  
1972  1128.17  441.57  2.61  1.22  
1973  1015.80  341.69  2.50  1.39  
1974  865.59  557.91  2.90  1.18  
1975  863.00  684.93  3.61  1.63  
1976  769.97  731.42  3.63  1.44  
1977  755.51  663.03  3.57  1.55  
1978  802.25  585.48  3.13  0.71  
1979  745.33  732.60  3.20  2.18  
1980  700.00  700.00  3.17  2.75  
1981  826.98  668.45  2.89  2.67  
1982  941.70  675.09  3.05  2.57  
1983  889.39  634.42  3.17  2.77  
1984  1007.83  531.69  2.52  2.40  
1985  989.57  511.73  2.79  2.09  
1986  963.53  641.20  3.40  2.99  
Note: The consumer price indices used to deflate actual prices have 1980 as the base year, thus, 
all prices in the table are in terms of 1980 values.  
Sources: Same as Table 16 and ILO (1981, 1988), IMF (1987).  
  
Table 18. Border equivalent consumer prices for mutton in the study countries, 1970–86.  
Year  
Côte d'Ivoire  Mali  Nigeria  Sudan  
CFA/kg  CFA/kg  Naira/kg  Pound/kg  
1970  290.45  241.23  0.76  0.32  
1971  308.47  271.57  0.82  0.34  
1972  356.89  324.48  0.96  0.44  
1973  415.50  391.82  1.23  0.54  
1974  472.86  431.71  1.31  0.58  
1975  445.30  394.44  1.86  0.65  
1976  521.01  460.21  2.12  0.68  
1977  595.04  515.16  2.44  0.76  
1978  687.95  623.51  2.84  1.02  
1979  721.29  610.92  3.02  1.27  
1980  848.68  734.25  3.28  1.75  
1981  1034.23  916.43  3.60  1.86  
1982  1103.39  965.72  3.76  2.69  
1983  1075.89  939.20  4.32  3.03  
1984  1239.09  1117.41  4.76  3.33  
1985  1235.17  1128.76  5.49  4.96  
1986  1097.72  950.33  7.63  6.13  
Note: Border prices have been converted at official exchange rates  
Sources: IMF (1987), World Bank (1986) and data collected from study countries.  
  
Table 19. Nominal consumer prices for milk in the study countries, 1972–86.  
Year  
Mali  Nigeria  Sudan  Zimbabwe  
CFA/kg  Naira/kg  Pound/kg  Cents/kg  
1972  70  0.51  0.15  14.08  
1973  70  0.59  0.15  14.08  
1974  70  0.67  0.15  15.83  
1975  70  0.94  0.19  15.83  
1976  70  0.96  0.19  19.35  
1977  70  1.10  0.19  20.00  
1978  75  1.34  0.19  20.00  
1979  75  1.42  0.19  23.33  
1980  75  1.34  0.44  26.67  
1981  75  1.21  0.44  26.67  
1982  110  1.48  0.44  26.67  
1983  110  1.18  0.78  26.67  
1984  110  5.88  0.87  40.00  
1985  110  6.00  1.07  50.00  
1986  148  7.64  1.26  60.00  
Sources: Mali - ULB (personal communication)  
Nigeria - Federal Ministry of Agriculture (1987) and FLD (personal communication)  
Sudan - Animal Production Corporation (personal communication)  
Zimbabwe - Agric. Marketing Authority (1986) and DMB. Report and accounts (various issues).  
  
Table 20. Real consumer prices for milk in the study countries, 1972–86.  
Year  
Mali  Nigeria  Sudan  Zimbabwe  
CFA/kg  Naira/kg  Pound/kg  Cents/kg  
1972  206.06  1.80  0.63  27.45  
1973  159.45  1.97  0.55  26.62  
1974  156.21  1.98  0.43  28.07  
1975  147.52  2.08  0.44  25.49  
1976  136.53  1.74  0.44  28.08  
1977  109.20  1.64  0.37  26.32  
1978  87.82  1.65  0.31  24.91  
1979  91.57  1.56  0.24  24.58  
1980  75.00  1.34  0.44  26.67  
1981  66.84  1.00  0.35  23.56  
1982  95.82  1.14  0.28  21.30  
1983  87.23  0.74  0.38  17.31  
1984  77.46  2.63  0.32  21.60  
1985  71.71  2.54  0.27  24.89  
1986  100.95  3.20  0.26  26.12  
Note: The consumer price indices used to deflate nominal prices have 1980 as the base year, 
thus, all prices in the table are in terms of 1980 values.  
Sources: Same as Table 19 and ILO (1981,1988), IMF (1987).  
Table 21. Border equivalent consumer prices for milk in the study countries, 1972–86.  
Year  
Mali  Nigeria  Sudan  Zimbabwe  
CFA/kg  Naira/kg  Pound/kg  Cents/kg  
1972  85.69  0.46  0.12  15.68  
1973  93.56  0.53  0.14  16.21  
1974  104.79  0.52  0.17  18.40  
1975  91.36  0.60  0.18  17.39  
1976  79.55  0.40  0.15  14.09  
1977  89.70  0.42  0.17  15.37  
1978  98.78  0.50  0.19  17.24  
1979  119.84  0.62  0.24  23.00  
1980  147.14  0.81  0.34  28.61  
1981  168.98  0.83  0.38  29.96  
1982  185.31  0.83  0.47  32.27  
1983  200.35  0.74  0.55  39.66  
1984  217.90  1.70  0.58  43.22  
1985  220.35  1.82  0.78  48.05  
1986  191.14  2.49  0.86  49.23  
Note: Border prices have been converted at official exchange rates.  
Sources: FAO Commodity Review and Outlook (1981-82), FAO Food Outlook (various issues), 
World Bank (1986) and data collected from the study countries.  
Table 22. Nominal protection coefficients for beef producers in the study countries, 1970–86.  
Year 
Côte 
d'Ivoire Mali Nigeria Sudan Zimbabwe 
1970 1.11 1.49 1.69 1.44 3.39 
1971 0.95 1.30 1.49 1.25 2.30 
1972 0.91 1.22 1.37 0.86 1.69 
1973 0.81 1.10 1.17 0.66 1.32 
1974 0.69 0.91 1.39 0.68 1.18 
1975 2.43 3.14 2.48 4.94 4.62 
1976 2.46 2.61 2.62 4.45 3.25 
1977 1.96 2.39 2.73 3.87 2.16 
1978 2.95 3.10 2.69 3.88 1.86 
1979 1.83 2.56 2.35 5.25 1.38 
1980 2.15 3.11 2.36 4.49 1.99 
1981 2.04 2.62 2.70 4.27 2.39 
1982 1.52 1.69 2.37 4.04 3.71 
1983 1.31 1.47 2.54 3.84 2.93 
1984 0.83 0.88 2.44 2.16 1.72 
1985 0.91 0.90 2.19 2.10 0.88 
1986 1.16 1.47 2.18 4.78 0.99 
Source: Estimated from data collected from the study countries by the author.  
  
Table 23. Nominal protection coefficients for mutton producers in the study countries, 1970–86.  
Year 
Côte 
d'Ivoire Nigeria Sudan 
1970 0.98 2.42 2.92 
1971 1.03 2.47 2.71 
1972 0.90 2.16 1.55 
1973 0.81 1.34 1.18 
1974 0.77 2.38 1.73 
1975 0.95 2.80 3.69 
1976 1.26 3.60 2.83 
1977 1.43 3.75 3.84 
1978 1.64 3.33 2.38 
1979 1.84 3.42 4.70 
1980 1.72 3.16 3.07 
1981 1.41 2.83 4.48 
1982 1.39 3.17 3.15 
1983 1.61 4.92 4.39 
1984 1.34 4.60 4.77 
1985 1.36 3.81 3.41 
1986 1.80 3.97 5.35 
Source: Estimated from data collected from the study countries by the author.  
Table 24. Nominal protection coefficients for milk producers in the study countries, 1971–86.  
Year Mali Sudan Zimbabwe 
1971 0.38 0.56 0.63 
1972 0.34 0.46 0.53 
1973 0.46 0.49 0.54 
1974 0.40 0.41 0.48 
1975 0.47 0.64 0.63 
1976 0.67 0.78 1.02 
1977 0.58 0.68 0.92 
1978 0.65 0.63 0.80 
1979 0.60 0.50 0.71 
1980 0.48 1.08 0.67 
1981 0.47 0.97 0.87 
1982 0.66 0.75 1.07 
1983 0.57 1.24 1.06 
1984 1.04 1.24 1.04 
1985 1.17 1.29 1.00 
1986 1.44 1.42 1.06 
Source: Estimated from data collected from the study countries by the author.  




Mali Nigeria Sudan Zimbabwe 
1970 0.63 1.00 0.90 0.61 1.22 
1971 0.54 0.76 0.82 0.52 0.96 
1972 0.51 0.61 0.75 0.41 0.76 
1973 0.48 0.50 0.56 0.47 0.82 
1974 0.43 0.44 0.74 0.46 0.75 
1975 1.04 2.55 1.28 1.40 1.79 
1976 1.00 2.16 1.40 1.23 1.67 
1977 1.00 1.70 1.29 1.24 1.37 
1978 1.26 2.17 1.35 0.57 1.34 
1979 0.91 1.64 1.21 1.37 0.83 
1980 1.00 1.82 1.26 1.43 0.89 
1981 1.12 2.05 1.30 2.09 1.16 
1982 1.00 1.51 1.30 1.37 1.22 
1983 0.88 1.34 1.36 1.43 1.05 
1984 0.72 1.03 1.37 1.49 0.72 
1985 0.72 1.07 1.27 1.10 0.55 
1986 0.77 1.27 1.15 1.61 0.49 
Source: Estimated from data collected from the study countries by the author  
  
Table 26. Nominal protection coefficients for mutton consumers in the study countries, 1970–86.  
Year 
Côte 
d'Ivoire Mali Nigeria Sudan 
1970 0.95 0.62 0.86 0.90 
1971 0.97 0.55 0.85 0.85 
1972 1.01 0.46 0.77 0.66 
1973 0.87 0.38 0.61 0.70 
1974 0.76 0.58 0.75 0.71 
1975 0.90 0.82 0.88 1.08 
1976 0.77 0.81 0.94 0.93 
1977 0.84 0.82 0.98 1.04 
1978 0.87 0.80 0.90 0.42 
1979 0.90 0.98 0.96 1.37 
1980 0.82 0.95 0.97 1.57 
1981 0.87 0.82 0.97 1.80 
1982 1.00 0.80 1.06 1.50 
1983 1.02 0.85 1.18 1.87 
1984 1.05 0.68 1.19 1.97 
1985 1.05 0.70 1.20 1.68 
1986 1.23 0.99 1.06 2.40 
Source: Estimated from data collected from the study countries by the author.  
Table 27. Nominal protection coefficients for milk consumers in the study countries, 1972–86.  
Year Mali Nigeria Sudan Zimbabwe 
1972 0.82 1.11 1.25 0.90 
1973 0.75 1.11 1.07 0.87 
1974 0.67 1.29 0.88 0.86 
1975 0.77 1.57 1.06 0.91 
1976 0.88 2.40 1.27 1.37 
1977 0.78 2.62 1.12 1.30 
1978 0.76 2.68 1.00 1.16 
1979 0.63 2.29 0.79 1.01 
1980 0.51 1.65 1.29 0.93 
1981 0.44 1.46 1.16 0.89 
1982 0.59 1.78 0.94 0.83 
1983 0.55 1.59 1.42 0.67 
1984 0.50 3.46 1.50 0.93 
1985 0.50 3.30 1.37 1.04 
1986 0.77 3.07 1.47 1.22 
Note: The milk considered here is evaporated and condensed milk in the case of Nigeria, while 
for the rest of the countries it is reconstituted milk.  
Source: Estimated from data collected from the study countries by the author.  
Table 28. Official exchange rates in the study countries, 1970–86.  
Year  
Côte 




1000  $/N1  $/PD1  S/Z$1  
1970  3.601  3.601  1.400  2.872  1.400  
1971  3.610  3.610  1.403  2.872  1.404  
1972  3.965  3.965  1.520  2.872  1.516  
1973  4.506  4.506  1.520  2.872  1.707  
1974  4.160  4.160  1.590  2.872  1.695  
1975  4.670  4.670  1.625  2.872  1.760  
1976  4.191  4.191  1.596  2.872  1.598  
1977  4.070  4.070  1.551  2.872  1.592  
1978  4.440  4.440  1.575  2.662  1.476  
1979  4.703  4.703  1.659  2.354  1.471  
1980  4.740  4.740  1.830  2.000  1.556  
1981  3.701  3.701  1.629  1.869  1.452  
1982  3.060  3.060  1.485  1.066  1.321  
1983  2.637  2.637  1.382  0.769  0.990  
1984  2.296  2.296  1.308  0.769  0.804  
1985  2.245  2.245  1.121  0.437  0.620  
1986  2.893  2.893  0.743  0.400  0.601  
Source: IMF (1987).  
  
Table 29. Consumer price indices in the study countries, 1970-86a.   
Year 
Côte 
d'Ivoire Mali Nigeria Sudan Zimbabwe 
1970 32.29 26.13 23.81 20.70 48.40 
1971 31.80 31.54 27.65 21.00 49.90 
1972 31.91 33.97 28.40 23.80 51.30 
1973 35.44 43.90 30.01 27.40 52.90 
1974 41.59 44.81 33.77 34.60 56.40 
1975 46.35 47.45 45.12 42.90 62.10 
1976 51.95 51.27 55.07 43.60 68.90 
1977 66.18 64.10 66.88 51.00 76.00 
1978 74.79 85.40 81.40 60.80 80.30 
1979 87.21 81.90 90.93 79.80 94.90 
1980 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1981 108.83 112.20 120.81 124.60 113.20 
1982 116.81 114.80 130.11 156.60 125.20 
1983 123.68 126.10 160.31 204.50 154.10 
1984 128.99 142.00 223.77 274.30 185.20 
1985 131.37 153.40 236.13 398.80 200.90 
1986 140.11 146.60 238.65 492.00 229.70 
1980 = 100  
a.  Food price index in the case of Mali.  
Source: ILO (1981 and 1988), IMF (1987).  
 
 
 
 
 
